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The Reception of Collective Actions in 
Europe: Reconstructing the Mental 
Process of a Legal Transplantation 
Csongor István Nagy* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The European collective action1 is probably one of the most exciting legal 
transplantations comparative law has seen.  Collective litigation, which U.S. law 
did not inherit from common law but invented with the 1966 revision of class 
actions, has been among the most successful export products of American legal 
scholarship.2  Today in the European Union, seventeen out of twenty–eight Member 
States have adopted a special regime for collective actions.3  At the same time, 
collective actions are intrinsically linked to various extraneous components of the 
legal system; hence, their transplantation calls for a comprehensive adaptation.  The 
need to rethink class actions has not only generated a heated debate in Europe about 
whether and how to introduce collective actions, but resulted in Europe’s making 
collective actions in its own image, producing something truly European: a model 
of collective actions à l’européenne. 
This Article presents the process of developing the European collective action 
and its outcome.  It represents the first attempt to give a transsystemic account of 
European collective actions and to elucidate them in light of the peculiarities and 
idiosyncrasies of the mindset of European jurisprudence.  Further, this Article gives 
 
 *  Professor of law and head of the Department of Private International Law at the University of 
Szeged; research chair and the head of the Federal Markets “Momentum” Research Group of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences; recurrent visiting professor at the Central European University 
(Budapest/New York), and the Sapientia University of Transylvania (Romania).  The research for this 
Article was supported by the project no. EFOP–3.6.2–16–2017–00007, titled Aspects on the 
Development of Intelligent, Sustainable, and Inclusive Society: Social, Technological, Innovation 
Networks in Employment and the Digital Economy (Apr. 5–6, 2019).  The project has been supported by 
the European Union, co–financed by the European Social Fund and the budget of Hungary. 
 1. This Article examines the collective enforcement of claims for monetary recovery; European 
mechanisms for non–monetary remedies (such as declaratory judgments, injunctions) fall outside of this 
paper’s focus.  Procedural mechanisms where individual actions are coordinated after they have been 
launched, such as the German Capital Markets Model Case Act, and collective settlement mechanisms, 
such as the Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages, also do not fall within the scope of 
the analysis because they do not advance the collective enforcement of claims.  In this Article, the term 
“opt–out system” means that group representatives may institute a collective action without any explicit 
authorization from the members of the group, who, in turn, may (or may not) leave the group through an 
express declaration (opt–out).  Those who are given notice but do not opt out expressly are considered 
to be assenting to the procedure.  The term “U.S. class action” will be used as the rough equivalent of 
the opt–out system.  The term “opt–in system” means that group representatives may act only on behalf 
of those group members who explicitly authorized them to do so, in other words, those who opted in.  
Further, in this Article, “collective action” will be used as a general term referring to group litigation 
mechanisms at large, while the term “class action” will refer to the U.S. system. 
 2. See Deborah R. Hensler, From Sea to Shining Sea: How and Why Class Actions Are Spreading 
Globally, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 965, 965–66 (2017). 
 3. CSONGOR ISTVAN NAGY, COLLECTIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE, ECONOMIC AND 
TRANSSYSTEMIC ANALYSIS 73–74 (2019). 
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an analytical presentation of the emerging European collective action model and 
demonstrates how it was shaped by Europe’s legal thinking and societal attitudes. 
First, this Article sets out the factors that make Europe different as to collective 
litigation—specifically, in Section II(A), the predominant role of the compensatory 
function and the disinclination to attribute to private entities a significant public 
policy role and to privatize public enforcement; the major, albeit unfounded, 
European fears concerning U.S. class actions which had a fundamental impact on 
European collective actions in Section II(B); and the special regulatory questions 
raised by Europe’s legal environment that do not emerge on the other side of the 
Atlantic in Section II(C).  Second, this Article gives a transsystemic presentation of 
European collective actions, including key issues such as purview (sectoral or 
general), standing, opt–in and opt–out principles, pre–requisites, status of group 
members (i.e., whether they are considered parties or non–parties), legal costs, 
funding, and res judicata effects. 
Ultimately, this Article demonstrates how Europe’s legal traditions and the 
mindset of European jurisprudence shaped the reception of collective actions, as 
well as how European legal systems have struggled with accommodating this 
conception.  It also points out the creative efforts of certain European countries to 
reconcile representation without authorization (the opt–out rule) with the taboo of 
party autonomy and the notion that the enforcement of public policy cannot be 
privatized. 
II.  WHAT MAKES EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE                                                 
ACTIONS SO “EUROPEAN” 
U.S. class actions have unquestionably been a reference point for European 
collective litigation.  While this mechanism had appeared in some Member States 
well before collective redress became a European issue,4 it came into the European 
scholarly discourse’s focus with the emergence of the European movement for 
competition law’s private enforcement.5  Although it was evident that the E.U. 
would not implement U.S. antitrust law’s scheme in its entirety, this was still 
regarded as a point of reference.  For a long time, it seemed that the E.U. would 
incorporate a collective redress mechanism into the legal regime on competition 
law’s private enforcement.6  Finally, however, this question was detached from 
competition law and became a general issue of E.U. law.7  As a result of this process, 
 
 4. For instance, in Spain in 1984, Greece in 1994, Portugal in 1995, and Hungary in 1996.  For an 
overview, see infra Section III. 
 5. See Green Paper: Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, at 8, COM (2005) 672 
final (Dec. 19, 2005); White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules , at 4, COM 
(2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008). 
 6. See ENNO AHLENSTIEL ET AL., EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2011: INTEGRATING 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW—IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS AND 
AGENCIES 511–36 (Philip Lowe & Mel Marquis eds., 2014). 
 7. See Green Paper: Consumer Collective Redress, at 2–3, COM (2008) 794 final (Nov. 11, 2008); 
Commission Communication Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress, at 11, 
COM (2013) 401 final (June 6, 2013) [hereinafter Commission Communication Towards a European 
Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress]; Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on 
Common Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member 
States Concerning Violations of Rights Granted Under Union Law, 2013 O.J. (L 201/60) 60–65 
[hereinafter Commission on Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress]. 
2
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2020, Iss. 2 [], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2020/iss2/12
No. 2] Reconstructing the Mental Process of a Legal Transplantation 415 
the E.U. issued the Recommendation on Collective Redress,8 which takes a very 
conservative approach but requires Member States to create a mechanism of 
collective litigation for the application of E.U. law.  The European discourse on 
group proceedings channeled in the various national collective mechanisms that had 
developed prior to and in parallel with these European efforts. 
The emerging European model differs from U.S. class actions in various 
important aspects, all of which are determined by European peculiarities.  Europe 
is transplanting a legal concept that originates from a completely different legal 
mindset, implying the mechanism needs to be fundamentally adapted to the 
receiving legal environment and remade.  In the end, it seems that U.S. class actions 
were not adopted but, rather, used as a source of inspiration. 
The European approach and its divergence from U.S. class actions is 
determined by three factors.  First, in Europe, the purpose of collective actions is 
different; contrary to the U.S. where class actions fulfill a primarily public policy 
function, in the E.U., it is the compensatory function that determines their operation.  
Second, the European discourse on collective litigation has featured various 
apprehensions, aversions, and fears about U.S. class actions.  Although these fears 
have been exaggerated, they did play a role in shaping the European model.  Third, 
while the U.S. class action provides patterns as to most regulatory questions, which 
can be adopted, adapted, or rejected, collective litigation in Europe raises a number 
of regulatory issues that do not emerge in the U.S. context and, consequently, for 
which there is simply no reference point on the other side of the Atlantic. 
A.  The Predominant Regulatory Purpose of                                     
Collective Litigation in Europe 
Collective actions, as private law remedies in general, have essentially two 
concurring functions: reparation for the injury and prevention of future violations.  
Of course, these functions are undoubtedly interlinked.  A compensation driven by 
purely reparatory considerations also deters future wrong–doing, and a private law 
remedy serving a preventive purpose also provides compensation.  Because they 
are not mutually exclusive but complementary, the relationship and role of these 
two functions—reparation and deterrence—cannot be described as a categorical 
choice.  Instead, the relevant question is their relative weight. 
In the U.S., actions for damages may have a clear and predominant public 
policy function.  The private plaintiff is, in some cases, regarded as the “private 
attorney general”9 who makes use of the incentives offered by the law to protect the 
public interest.  As noted by the Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc., in the context of antitrust law, “the purpose of giving private parties 
treble–damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to provide private relief, but 
was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws.”10  In the same 
 
 8. Commission on Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress, supra note 7, at 
60. 
 9. See Christopher Hodges, Objectives, Mechanisms and Policy Choices in Collective Enforcement 
and Redress, in MASS JUSTICE 101–17 (Jenny Steele & Willem H. van Boom eds., 2011); JOANNE 
BLENNERHASSETT, A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF MULTI–PARTY ACTIONS: THE CASE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL MASS HARM 28 (2016). 
 10. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100, 130–31 (1969); Jason Rathod 
& Sandeep Vaheesan, The Arc and Architecture of Private Enforcement Regimes in the United States 
3
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vein, in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., the Supreme Court, in referring to treble 
damages available under U.S. antitrust law, stressed that “[b]y offering potential 
litigants the prospect of a recovery in three times the amount of their damages, 
Congress encouraged these persons to serve as ‘private attorneys general.’”11 
The public policy purpose stands out markedly in the case of class actions.12  
The 1966 introduction of opt–out collective actions was inspired by the idea that 
collective litigation on behalf of large groups of people could effectively 
supplement the government’s regulatory and enforcement efforts, especially in 
cases of small claims which would not otherwise get to court.13  Furthermore, 
“[c]ivil rights cases and other suits seeking social change or to implement 
institutional reform were, in many ways, the quintessential type of class action 
envisioned at the time of the 1966 amendments.”14 
The prevalence of this public policy function, at least in terms of extent, is alien 
to E.U. law in which collective actions have been regarded as serving a 
predominantly compensatory function.  While the practical non–enforceability of 
small value claims is often conceived as a question of effectiveness,15 it also has 
serious human rights and rule–of–law implications.16  Even though the public policy 
function is being upgraded in certain fields, such as competition law,17 in terms of 
 
and Europe: A View Across the Atlantic, 14 U.N.H.L. REV. 303, 308 (2016) (“Private parties can also 
be empowered to file lawsuits and serve as ‘private attorneys general.’”). 
 11. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. 
International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 147 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring in the result); S.I. Strong, 
Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class Action Have a New Analogue?, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899, 899 (2012); Sándor Udvary, The Advantages and Disadvantages of Class 
Action, 9 IUSTUM AEQUUM SALUTARE 67, 74 (2013), http://ias.jak.ppke.hu/hir/ias/20131sz/05.pdf 
(Hung.). 
 12. Cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. at 130–31. 
 13. See Harry Kalven & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 684, 687 (1941). 
 14. Nicholas M. Pace, Class Actions in the United States of America: An Overview of the Process & 
the Empirical Literature, GLOBAL CLASS ACTION EXCHANGE: COUNTRY REPORTS 8 (2008), 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/USA__National_Report.pdf. 
 15. See Karl–Alexander Neumann & Landon Wade Magnusson, Pour Une Action Collective 
Européenne Dans le Droit de la Concurrence, 24 REV. QUÉBÉCOISE DE DROIT INT’L [R.Q.D.I.] 149, 
154–55 (2011), https://www.sqdi.org/wp-content/uploads/24-2_5_Neumaa_Magnusson.pdf (Can.); 
Zygimantas Juska, Obstacles in European Competition Law Enforcement: A Potential Solution from 
Collective Redress, 7 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 114, 128 (2014); THIJS BOSTERS, COLLECTIVE REDRESS AND 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE E.U. 17 (2017). 
 16. For an overview on the intersection between collective actions and human rights, and access to 
justice in particular, see CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE 
ACTIONS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 187–92 (2008); SONJA LANGE, DAS BEGRENZTE 
GRUPPENVERFAHREN: KONZEPTION EINES VERFAHRENS ZUR BEWÄLTIGUNG VON GROßSCHÄDEN AUF 
DER BASIS DES KAPITALANLEGER–MUSTERVERFAHRENSGESETZES 95–106 (2011) (Ger.); Neumann & 
Magnusson, supra note 15, at 151–52; Stefan Wrbka et. al., Access to Justice and Collective Actions: 
“Florence” and Beyond, in COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: ENHANCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND RECONCILING 
MULTILAYER INTERESTS? 1–22 (Stefan Wrbka, Steven J. van Uytsel, & Mathias M. Siems eds., 2012); 
Maria–José Azar–Baud, La Nature Juridique Des Actions Collectives en Droit de la Consommation, 
2012 (1) REV. EUROPÉENNE DE EROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION [R.E.D.C.] 3, 15–18 (2012) (Fr.); Maria 
Teresa Vanikiotis, Private Antitrust Enforcement and Tentative Steps Toward Collective Redress in 
Europe and the United Kingdom, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1639, 1640–41 (2014); RACHAEL MULHERON, 
THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 52–57 (2014). 
 17. See Case C–724/17, Vantaan Kaupunki v. Skanska Indus. Sols. Oy, NCC Indus. Oy, Asfaltmix 
Oy Skanska, 2019 CURIA paras. 43–45 (Mar. 13, 2019).  Attorney General Wahl took the position that 
in competition law, private enforcement’s major rationale is deterrence and the compensatory function 
is secondary.  This stance, however, seems not to have questioned the private enforcement’s traditional 
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effects, collective actions are not granted more room than justified by the 
compensatory function. 
This symbiosis of compensatory and public policy purposes has shaped 
European collective actions.  The European Commission’s Recommendation on 
Collective Redress defines collective actions as a means to “facilitate access to 
justice in relation to violations of rights under Union law” and to reinforce the 
effectiveness of E.U. law.18  The Recommendation is based on the premise that 
collective actions enhance both the effectiveness of the law through stopping and 
deterring unlawful practices and the chance to obtain a real legal remedy through 
compensation.19 
It is because of the above considerations that statistical comparisons between 
E.U. and U.S. collective actions are misleading.  E.U. collective actions were never 
meant to replace public enforcement, but simply to assist it.  Hence, they are not 
expected to operate at the same intensity as U.S. class actions.  In Europe, the 
purpose of collective actions is to ensure an effective remedy and to reap the 
benefits of this to further the effectiveness of law. 
The above regulatory purpose points out the root cause of most European fears 
against collective actions, especially opt–out proceedings.  In the European mindset, 
private litigation having a remarkable public policy function is undesirable and 
considered to encroach on the exclusive prerogative of the state.  This aversion 
emerges in spite of the fact that collective actions are closely supervised and 
controlled by the court, from the opening of the procedure until the approval of the 
settlement and adoption of the final judgment.20  While the opposition against 
collective actions has been using various labels, it should not be forgotten that the 
root cause of all these fears and criticisms is the notion that, in the U.S., class actions 
have been used as a means to privatize the enforcement of public policy, but in 
Europe, this should be avoided by all means. 
It is very telling that European resistance was less strong in cases where the 
opt–out principle’s social impact was limited or even insignificant.  This may 
suggest that the apprehension about the privatization of a parcel of public policy 
was an unspoken argument against class actions.  For instance, Directive 
2009/22/EC, which consolidated Directive 98/27/EC and its amendments, 
authorizes administrative agencies and consumer organizations to institute 
proceedings in an opt–out system for the infringement of the E.U.’s consumer 
protection rules.21  Still, this opt–out mechanism has met no major criticism.  The 
fact that the Directive is limited to claims for injunction and declaratory judgment22 
arguably played a role in this.  Because the Directive’s opt–out mechanism is not 
 
civil law foundations and to have simply confirmed that the main reason why civil liability is so 
important for E.U. law is that it also has a deterrent effect.  Id. at ¶¶ 28, 50. 
 18. Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013, supra note 7, at 61. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See ÉLODIE FALLA, THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN COLLECTIVE REDRESS LITIGATION: 
COMPARATIVE REPORT (2014). 
 21. Currently, Directive 2009/22/EC lists 16 E.U. consumer protection Union acts that are 
strengthened by the possibility of collective action.  See Directive 2009/22/EC of the European 
Parliament and of The Council of 23 Apr. 2009 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests, 
2009 O.J. (L110) 30. 
 22. Article 7 provides that Member States are free to give these organizations “more extensive rights 
to bring action at [the] national level.”  Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of The 
Council of 23 Apr. 2009 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests, supra note 21, at 32. 
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available for monetary remedies,23 it was not perceived to be a tool of privatizing 
public policy. 
B.  European Fears and Aversions                                                                
to Collective Litigation 
Collective litigation, particularly the notion that group members may be 
represented without express authorization, has given rise to fear and revulsion in 
Europe.  First, “representation without authorization” is claimed to be 
unconstitutional due to its encroachment on private autonomy.  Second, the 
practical feasibility of class actions to actually deliver redress has been impugned 
with reference to technical difficulties of identification and proof.  Third, class 
actions have been claimed to inflict significant social damages due to their being 
prone to abusive litigation (blackmailing potential).  Although all these fears have 
been exaggerated, they had an impact on the European model. 
1.  The Taboo of Private Autonomy 
It is widely accepted that the opt–out system may raise constitutional concerns.  
“Representation without authorization” may impair group members’ private 
autonomy, which consists of, in this context, the right to decide whether or not to 
enforce a claim and, if so,  how to enforce it.24  This gives a golden opportunity for 
European traditionalism to wrap up its aversion against collective litigation in 
constitutional parlance. 
It is true that mandatory representation—that is, representation without 
authorization not supplemented by the right to opt–out—may be irreconcilable with 
constitutional requirements.  For instance, in Spain, where the judgment’s res 
judicata effects may extend to non–litigant group members, it has been 
convincingly argued that absent a specific statutory provision, the right to opt out 
arises from the constitutional principles of due process and access to justice.25  
Nevertheless, representation without authorization supplemented with the right to 
opt out may merit a different treatment.  It is noteworthy that this is in line with the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s stance that class actions based on representation without 
authorization meet the requirements of due process as long as members have the 
 
 23. See J. Silguero Estagnan, Las Acciones Colectivas de Grupo, 3 ARANZADI CIVIL: REVISTA 
QUINCENAL 2261 (2004) (Spain). 
 24. See Commission Communication Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective 
Redress, supra note 7; See also S.I. Strong, Cross–Border Collective Redress in the European Union: 
Constitutional Rights in the Face of the Brussels I Regulation, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 233, 244–45 (2013) 
(referring to these considerations as the plaintiff’s “individual participatory right”). 
 25. For a comprehensive analysis on the Spanish class action mechanism, see LUIS JAVIER MIERES, 
ACERCA DE LA CONSTITUCIONALIDAD DE LA NUEVA REGULACIÓN DE LAS ACCIONES COLECTIVAS 
PROMOVIDAS POR ASOCIACIONES DE CONSUMIDORES Y USUARIOS (Barcelona, 2000).  See also LAURA 
CARBALLO PIÑEIRO, LAS ACCIONES COLECTIVAS Y SU EFICACIA EXTRATERRITORIAL: PROBLEMAS DE 
RECEPCIÓN Y TRANSPLANTE DE LAS “CLASS ACTIONS” EN EUROPA 61–88 (Santiago de Compostela, 
2009); J. M. López Jiménez, Las Acciones Colectivas Como Medio de Protección de los Derechos e 
Intereses  de  los Consumidores, 6852 DIARIO LA LEY (2008), http://blog.adicae.net/consumidores-201
4/files/2014/12/Las_acciones_colectivas_como_medio_de_protecci%C3%B3n_de_los_derechos_e_int 
ereses_de_los_consumidores.pdf  (Spain); J. J. Marín López, Las Acciones de Clase en el Derecho 
Español, INDRET 3, 3–13 (2001), http://www.indret.com/pdf/057_es.pdf (Spain); J. Estagnan, supra 
note 23, at 9. 
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right to opt out.26  Interestingly, the rigid unconstitutionality arguments have found 
no reflection in the constitutional case–law. 
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) addressed this question of 
representation without authorization27 in Lithgow v. United Kingdom,28 specifically 
in the context of a scheme that established mandatory representation without 
authorization where group members were forced to join and could not opt out.  The 
U.K. expropriated a British company and, led by the desire to avoid the mass of 
individual actions, appointed a “stockholders’ representative” whose power of 
attorney to claim compensation precluded group members’ individual actions.  The 
ECHR held: 
The right of access to the courts secured by Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6–1) is 
not absolute but may be subject to limitations; these are permitted by 
implication since the right of access “by its very nature calls for regulation 
by the State, regulation which may vary in time and in place according to 
the needs and resources of the community and of individuals.”29 
The limitations may not impair the very essence of the right and need to “pursue a 
legitimate aim,” and there needs to be “a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.”30  As to the 
scheme at stake, the ECHR concluded that these conditions were met.  The very 
essence of the right to a trial (court) was not impaired31 because individual rights 
were safeguarded, albeit indirectly: the group representative was “appointed by and 
represented the interests of all” group members, and individual group members 
could seek remedy in case the representative breached one of his duties.  This 
conclusion was not undermined by the fact that the group members’ right to control 
the representative was very limited, and it was not the individual shareholders but 
their community that was entitled to exercise these rights.32  Furthermore, the Court 
held that the scheme “pursued a legitimate aim, namely the desire to avoid, in the 
context of a large–scale nationalization measure, a multiplicity of claims and 
proceedings brought by individual shareholders,” and there was “a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and this aim.”33 
The above jurisprudence was confirmed in Wendenburg.34  In the context of a 
procedure before the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), the ECHR, referring to Lithgow, held that while “the 
applicants were barred from appearing individually before that court, . . . in 
proceedings involving a decision for a collective number of individuals, it is not 
always required or even possible that every individual concerned is heard before 
the court.”35 
 
 26. Philipps Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813–14 (1985). 
 27. For an analysis on the ECHR case–law, see Strong, supra note 24, at 243–45. 
 28. Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 329 (1986). 
 29. Id. at ¶ 194(a). 
 30. Id. at ¶ 194(c). 
 31. Id. at ¶ 196. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at ¶ 197. 
 34. Wendenburg and Others v. Germany, 2003–II Eur. Ct. H.R. 347, 353. 
 35. Id. at ¶ 3.  
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The French Constitutional Council (“Conseil Constitutionnel”) examined the 
de facto opt–out collective action introduced by the French legislature in 2014 and 
found it constitutional.  It is a central feature of the French regime that although the 
group representative may launch a collective action without the group members’ 
express authorization, the final judgment, in essence, will extend only to those who 
expressly accept the award; at this stage, tacit adherence is not sufficient.  It seems 
that it was decisive for the French Constitutional Council that the res judicata effects 
covered solely those group members who received compensation at the end of the 
procedure.36  Apparently, the fact that only benefits accrued to group members and 
that the judgment’s res judicata effects covered only those who assented to it (since 
compensation can be paid only if the group member accepts the final judgment) 
were sufficient to do away with the constitutional concerns. 
Notwithstanding the above constitutional jurisprudence, party autonomy has 
played a huge role in some Member States’ rejection of collective actions, 
particularly opt–out proceedings.  In Germany, opt–out class actions were rejected 
for constitutional reasons; for example, it may impair the right to a hearing (Recht 
zum rechtlichen Gehör) and the right of disposition (Dispositionsgrundsatz).37  
While it could be argued that silence should imply acceptance, such a legal 
consequence may emerge only if there is proper notice, and it is highly questionable 
whether constructive knowledge would suffice in this regard.38  The foregoing 
constitutional concerns have been taken so seriously that in 2005, the German 
Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt), notwithstanding the very strong policy 
for competition law’s private enforcement, discarded the idea of opt–out class 
actions apparently because it was said to restrict the right to a hearing and to violate 
the principle that the party is the master of his or her own case (right of 
disposition).39 
In the context of French law, the protection of party autonomy has been 
consistently described by the principle of nul ne plaide par procureur, meaning “no 
 
 36. Consiel Constitutionnel, Decision 2014–690 du 13 Mars 2014: Loi Relative à la Consommation, 
CONSIEL CONSTITUTIONNEL 5–7 (Mar. 13, 2014), https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/sites/default/fi
les/as/root/bank_mm/decisions/2014690dc/2014690dc.pdf (Fr.). 
 37. See CHRISTOPH GREINER, DIE CLASS ACTION IM AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT UND DEUTSCHER 
ORDRE PUBLIC 189 (1998); LILLY FIEDLER, CLASS ACTIONS ZUR DURCHSETZUNG DES EUROPÄISCHEN 
KARTELLRECHTS: NUTZEN UND MÖGLICHE PROZESSUALE AUSGESTALTUNG VON KOLLEKTIVEN 
RECHTSSCHUTZVERFAHREN IM DEUTSCHEN RECHT ZUR PRIVATEN DURCHSETZUNG DES 
EUROPÄISCHEN KARTELLRECHTS 237–45 (2010); LANGE, supra note 16, at 129–73; Astrid Stadler, 
Mass Tort Litigation, in COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON BUSINESS TORT LITIGATION 163, 172–73 (Rolf 
Stürner & Masanori Kawano eds., 2011); CAROLINE GEIGER, KOLLEKTIVER RECHTSSCHUTZ IM 
ZIVILPROZESS: DIE GRUPPENKLAGE ZUR DURCHSETZUNG VON MASSENSCHÄDEN UND IHRE 
AUSWIRKUNGEN 245–55 (2015). 
 38. Astrid Stadler, Die Internationale Anerkennung von Urteilen und Vergleichen aus Verfahren des 
Kollektiven Rechtsschutzes mit op–out Mechanismen, in Ars Aequi et Boni in Mundo. Festschrift für Rolf 
A. Schütze zum 80. Geburtstag 561, 569–78 (Reinhold Geimer, Athanassios Kaissis, & Roderich C. 
Thümmel eds., 2015).  For arguments that public notice in collective actions does not violate the 
principle of disposition, see Axel Halfmeier, Recognition of a WCAM settlement in Germany, 30(2) 
NEDERLANDS INT’L PRIVAATRECHT [NIPR] 176, 183 (2012). 
 39. Bundeskartellamt, Diskussionspapier: Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung: Stand, Probleme, 




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2020, Iss. 2 [], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2020/iss2/12
No. 2] Reconstructing the Mental Process of a Legal Transplantation 421 
one pleads by proxy.”40  According to this entrenched principle of French civil 
procedural law, to have standing, the plaintiff must have a legitimate interest in the 
case, and to be legitimate, the interest must be direct and personal; hence, all persons 
involved in the lawsuit must be identified and represented in the procedure.41  This 
consideration and the sanctity of party autonomy presumably played a role in 
shaping the French opt–out system adopted in 2014, where the binding effect of the 
collective judgment was evaded by giving group members the right to accept the 
judgment after it was delivered.42  While the Constitutional Council’s decision 
examined above does not suggest that this was the only way for a collective action 
to satisfy the constitutional requirements, the legislature’s careful approach shows 
the concept of private autonomy plays a very important role that goes beyond 
mandatory constitutional requirements. 
2.  Collective Redress is Infeasible and Fails                                                
to Enrich Group Members 
A frequent argument against opt–out class actions is that group members 
frequently do not get their money and, instead, the benefits go to the law firm that 
represents the group.43  This view emerges from the fact that group members are 
not identified beforehand, which may cause difficulties when distributing the 
award.  This concern reinforces the argument that opt–out class actions may be 
driven by illicit financial motivations.  In other words, law firms push collective 
actions forward to earn money and may leave group members without any real 
compensation. 
This criticism exaggerates the problem of identification and overlooks that in 
opt–out systems, as a general rule, the award is normally distributed to group 
members.44  Nonetheless, it did obsess European collective action law with the idea 
 
 40. Noël J. Mazen, Le Recours Collectif: Réalité Québeccoise et Projet Français, 39(2) REV. INT’L 
DE DROIT COMPARE 373, 383–84 (1987). 
 41. Laurel Harbour et al., Proposed Reforms in France in Chapter 4: Representative Actions and 
Proposed Reforms in the European Union, in WORLD CLASS ACTIONS: A GUIDE TO GROUP AND 
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 166 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012). 
 42. NAGY, supra note 3, at 64–66. 
 43. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress, at 12, COM (2013) 0401 final (2013) (“[A]n ‘opt–out’ system may 
not be consistent with the central aim of collective redress, which is to obtain compensation for harm 
suffered, since such persons are not identified, and so the award will not be distributed to them.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 44. As regards claims administration, see Katherine Kinsella & Shannon Wheatman, Chapter 14: 
Class Notice and Claims Administration, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW 264, 273–74 (Albert A. Foer & Jonathan W. Cuneo eds., 2010); 
Katherine Kinsella & Shannon Wheatman, Chapter 13: Class Notice and Claims Administration, in 
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 338 (Albert A. Foer & Randy M. 
Stutz eds., 2012).  Although in certain systems “fluid recovery” or “cy pres” is available, this does not 
necessarily have to be adopted along with the introduction of collective actions (though it is advisable).  
See Janet C. Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States 21–22 (July 21–
22, 2000), http://law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf (Conference Paper: Debates 
Over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective); Albert A. Foer, Chapter 14: Cy Pres as a Remedy 
in Private Antitrust Litigation, in PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
349 (Albert A. Foer & Randy M. Stutz eds., 2012) (“The normal remedies in a private antitrust case are 
a combination of injunctions and treble damages that are paid to the victim or victims of the 
anticompetitive activity.  When an aggregate amount of damages is established, the primary objective is 
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that there is a need for a heightened requirement of definability; opt–out collective 
actions should be allowed only if group members are clearly identifiable by means 
of the group definition.  Definability is, of course, not a major issue in opt–in 
proceedings, as the judgment extends to a list of specific persons who opted in. 
3.  Financial Incentives Lead to Abusive                                          
Litigation (Blackmail) 
Perhaps the gravest fear against collective actions, especially opt–out 
proceedings, is that they may lead to a litigation boom and enable group 
representatives to blackmail defendants and wring illegitimate settlements.45  The 
U.S. is often used to demonstrate the risks of opt–out collective actions.  There is a 
general distrust of privatizing the enforcement of public policy and a fear that 
private financial incentives and interests are not reconcilable with the protection of 
the public interest.  This is based on the notion that market–based mechanisms 
operating by means of financial incentives cannot secure outcomes that adequately 
further the public interest. 
U.S. law contains a large set of financial incentives that make up a financing 
pattern for collective plaintiffs: gargantuan punitive damages, treble damages in 
certain fields, the absence of a “loser pays” principle,46 one–way cost–shifting in 
certain fields,47 contingency fees, and entrepreneurial lawyering.48  Even though 
these financial incentives are equally available to individual plaintiffs, they catalyze 
collective litigation. 
The above consideration has two key implications.  First, the financial 
incentives provided by U.S. law, although largely unknown in Europe, are 
considered to be especially dangerous in the context of collective litigation.  
Second, the European model of collective actions rejects any market–based funding 
that uses risk–sharing to finance collective litigation.  These two aspects exist not 
only in relation to opt–out collective proceedings, but also opt–in actions.  This is 
reflected in the Recommendation on Collective Redress, which proposes the 
introduction of opt–in collective actions but still bans contingency fees and all other 
financial incentives for lawyers, punitive damages, and award–based returns in 
third–party financing.49 
 
to distribute the damages to those who were injured.  In antitrust class action litigation, however, it is 
often impossible or impracticable to compensate all victims.  Administrative concerns may work against 
payments to individual plaintiffs, as in the case of an extremely large class where the fund is not sufficient 
to justify the transaction costs of distribution to individual claimants.  Consequently, in some cases, there 
is money left over in the form of unclaimed funds.  In such cases, courts sometimes employ the doctrine 
of ‘cy pres’ to put the unclaimed funds to ‘the next best use,’ which may include awarding funds to 
public interest organizations or charities for purposes related to the case.”). 
 45. See, e.g., HODGES, supra note 16, at 131–32. 
 46. Id.  (under the “American rule” on attorney’s fees, the parties pay their attorney irrespective of the 
action’s outcome). 
 47. If the claimant wins, he is entitled to compensation for his reasonable attorney’s fees, but this does 
not work the other way around.  See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a) (2020); Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2020); Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (2020). 
 48. The law–firm invests money and working hours in the action.  Thus, in exchange for an appropriate 
risk premium, it takes over the risks of litigation from the parties.  See Alexander, supra note 44. 
 49. Commission on Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress, supra note 7, at 
64, ¶¶ 29–32 (E.U.). 
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C.  Novel Questions of Collective                                                          
Actions in Europe 
Collective actions are legal transplants alien to traditional civil law thinking.  
Hence, once introduced, they call for the re–consideration of a wide array of 
questions.50 
1.  Funding and Distrust of Market–Based Mechanisms                               
in the Enforcement of Public Policy                   
As noted above, European legal systems are largely devoid of the financial 
incentives that stimulate litigation in the U.S.  In the U.S., class actions are normally 
financed by law firms, which are incited by the reward of a contingency fee and, 
due to American law, protected against the risks related to the defendant’s 
attorney’s fees.  In Europe, on the other hand, there is no comparable market, not 
only because class actions have no history, but also because litigation is less 
profitable.  In the U.S., law firms are compensated via legal institutions of general 
application (such as punitive and treble damages, one–way cost–shifting, etc.) for 
the immense risk they assume.  At the same time, there are no such mechanisms on 
the other side of the Atlantic.  This circumstance calls for regulatory intervention, 
given that financing is the oil in the engine of collective actions.51 
Unfortunately, European collective action laws have failed to settle or even 
address the problem of financing.  While they ruled out the American institutions 
that stimulate the operation of U.S. class actions, they failed to replace these with 
appropriate substitutes.  The European fear of American–style financial incentives 
has been so immense that the Recommendation on Collective Redress suggests the 
introduction of safeguards in order to obviate incentives to abuse the opt–in 
mechanism it proposes.  It makes the use of the “loser pays” principle mandatory,52 
excludes, at least in principle, contingency fees,53 and prohibits punitive damages.54  
Furthermore, it restricts group representation to non–profit entities.55  The exclusion 
of market–based mechanisms inevitably calls for public and charitable funding. 
2.  Two–Way Cost–Shifting 
In the U.S., group members do not run the risk of becoming responsible for the 
defendant’s attorney’s fees.  In Europe, however, the principle of two–way cost–
shifting prevails, implying that group members’ financial liability for legal costs 
 
 50. On the financing options in Europe, see Stefaan Voet, The Crux of the Matter: Funding and 
Financing Collective Redress Mechanisms, in E.U. CIVIL JUSTICE: CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE 
OUTLOOK 201 (Burkhard Hess, Maria Bergström, & Eva Storskrubb eds., 2016). 
 51. See Csongor Istvan Nagy, The European Collective Redress Debate After the European 
Commission’s Recommendation: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 22(4) MAASTRICHT J. 
EUROPEAN & COMP. L. 530, 548–550 (2015). 
 52. Commission on Principles for Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress, supra note 7, ¶ 
13. 
 53. Id. at ¶¶ 29–30.  According to the Recommendation, contingency fees can be permitted only 
exceptionally. 
 54. Id. at ¶ 31. 
 55. Id. at ¶ 4. 
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has to be addressed.  The general principle of civil procedure requires that someone 
be obliged to reimburse the winning party for his legal expenses, and there is no 
reason to deprive the defendants of collective actions of this protection.  This 
obligation may be placed either on individual group members or on the group 
representative.  In opt–in systems both variations are conceivable, as group 
members join the collective action voluntarily.  Opt–out systems, however, contain 
an additional twist: the strongest argument for the constitutionality of opt–out class 
actions is that they confer only benefits and no disadvantages on group members; 
this argument would lose weight if group members were exposed to the risk of being 
liable for the defendant’s legal costs. 
III.  EUROPEAN MODELS OF COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 
Collective actions have not been “federalized” in the E.U.  The application of 
E.U. law is, for the most part, carried out by Member States, which have procedural 
autonomy.56  While national law must not discriminate between the application of 
E.U. and domestic law (principle of equivalence)57 and “must not be so framed as 
to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation 
(principle of effectiveness),”58 Member States are free to determine the structure 
and method of application and enforcement.  There have been no legislative efforts 
to federalize collective actions, with the exception of the European Commission’s 
2013 Recommendation on Collective Redress,59 a non–binding instrument that only 
holds “persuasive authority” for national legislators.60 
The European history of collective actions started in the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s.61  Aside from the English representative action, a doctrine rooted in 
common law but rarely used in practice,62 collective action legislation first appeared 
in Spain (1984), Greece (1994), Portugal (1995), and Hungary (1996).63  
Interestingly, all these systems were based on the opt–out principle and, even more 
interestingly, they proved to be less effective than one would expect from an opt–
out scheme.  These were followed by the introduction of various opt–in and opt–
out schemes.  Today, seventeen out of twenty–eight Member States provide for 
 
 56. See, e.g., Case 51–54/71 International Fruit Company, 1971 E.C.R. 1107, ¶¶ 3–4. 
 57. See, e.g., Case 33/76, Rewe–Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe–Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer 
für das Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989, ¶ 5. 
 58. See, e.g., Case C–261/95 Rosalba Palmisani v. Istituto Nazionale Della Previdenza Sociale 
[INPS], 1997 E.C.R. I–4025, ¶ 27. 
 59. For an analysis of the Recommendation, see Laura Carballo Piñeiro, Recomendación de la 
Comisión Europea Sobre los Principios Comunes Aplicables a los Mecanismos de Recurso Colectivo de 
Cesación o de Indemnización en los Estados Miembros en caso de Violación de los Derechos 
Reconocidos por el Derecho de la Unión Europea (11 de Junio de 2013), 65(2) REV. ESPAÑOLA DE 
DERECHO INT’L 395 (2013); Ákos Szalai, Kollektív Keresetek Joggazdaságtana, 10(1) IUSTUM AEQUUM 
SALUTARE 163 (2014); Nagy, supra note 51, at 530–31. 
 60. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, Oct. 26, 
2012 O.J. (C–326). 
 61. See Duncan Fairgrieve & Geraint Howells, Collective Redress Procedures: European Debates, 
58 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 379, 383–401 (2009). 
 62. Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives 
to American Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 402 (2002). 
 63. 1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról (Act 
LVII of 1996 on the Law Prohibiting Unfair Market Conduct and Restrictions on Competition of 1996, 
§ 85/A). 
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collective actions,64 and ten of them have a system based, at least partially, on the 
opt–out principle65 (Belgium,66 Bulgaria,67 Denmark,68 France,69 Greece,70 
Hungary,71 Portugal,72 Slovenia,73 Spain,74 and the U.K.75).  Accordingly, more than 
 
 64. The Commission’s Report on the implementation of the Recommendation on Collective Redress 
asserts that “Compensatory collective redress is available in 19 Member States (AT, BE, BG, DE, DK, 
FI, FR, EL, HU, IT, LT, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, ES, SE, UK).”  Commission on Principles for Injunctive 
and Compensatory Collective Redress, supra note 7, at 3.  However, somewhat misleadingly, it also lists 
Member States where there is admittedly no “legislation on compensatory relief” but “collective actions 
are carried out on the basis of the assignment of claims or the joinder of cases.”  Id. 
 65. Contra Commission Recommendation, supra note 7, at 13 (considering the French, the Hungarian, 
and the Spanish law to contain an opt–in system). 
 66. The Belgian system leaves it to the judge to decide whether the action should be conducted 
according to the opt–in or the opt–out model.  Loi portant insertion d’un titre 2 « De l’action en réparation 
collective » au livre XVII « Procédures juridictionnelles particulières » du Code de droit économique et 
portant insertion des définitions propres au livre XVII dans le livre 1er du Code de droit économique 
[Law Inserting a Title 2 on ‘Collective Compensation Action’ in Book XVII ‘Special Jurisdictional 
Procedures’ of the Code of Economic Law] (Mar. 28 2014).  MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette 
of Belgium] (Mar. 29, 2014) (combining this law with ¶ XVII.38 and ¶ I.21 of the Belgian Code of 
Economic Law). 
 67. BULGARIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Ch. 33, ¶¶ 379–88 (2008), https://kenarova.com/law/Co
de%20of%20Civil%20Procedure.pdf (Bulg.).  See Alexander Katzarsky & Georgi Georgiev, Chapter 
11: Bulgaria, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO CLASS & GROUP ACTIONS 64 
(Ian Dodds–Smith & Alison Brown eds., 2012). 
 68. Bekendtgørelse Af Lov Om Rettens Pleje [Administration of Justice Act], LBK No. 1139, §§ 
254a–254e (2014) (DK). 
 69. In France, de facto opt–out class actions were first introduced in the field of consumer protection 
in 2014 (Loi n° 2014–344 du 17 mars 2014 relative à la consommation et Décr. n° 2014–1081 du 24 
Sept. 2014 relatif à l’action de groupe en matière de consommation), followed by the health care sector 
in January 2016 (Loi n° 2016–41 du 26 Janv. 2016 de modernisation de notre système de santé et Décr. 
n° 2016–1249 du 26 Sept. 2016 relatif à l’action de groupe en matière de santé).  In November 2016, a 
general framework was created in France for group actions (Loi n° 2016–1547 du 18 Nov. 2016 de 
modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle, JORF n°0269 du 19 Nov. 2016 texte n° 1).  The new regime 
extended the purview of the mechanism to discrimination, environmental and personal data, and health 
care matters, inserting Sections 826–2–826–24 into the French Code of Civil Procedure. 
 70. Protection of Consumers, Art. 10(16)–(29), (Act No. 2251/1994), https://www.eccgreece.gr/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/N2251-1994-enc2007-en1.pdf (Greece). 
 71. 1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról (Act 
LVII of 1996 on the Law Prohibiting Unfair Market Conduct and Restrictions on Competition of 1996, 
§ 85/A); 1997. évi CLV. törvény a fogyasztóvédelemről (Act CLV of 1997 on the Law of Consumer 
Protection, § 38–39); 2016. évi CXXX. törvény a polgári perrendtartásról (Act CXXX of 2016 on the 
Code of Civil Procedure, §§ 580–91) (Hung.). 
 72. Right to Procedural Participation and Popular Action, No. 83/95, http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei
_mostra_articulado.php?nid=722&tabela=leis&so_miolo= (Port.).  See also Leonor Rossi & Miguel 
Sousa Ferro, Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Portugal (II): Actio Popularis—Facts, Fictions 
and Dreams, 4 REV. DE CONCORRÊNCIA E REGULAÇÃO 35, 46–64 (2013); Miguel Sousa Ferro, 
Collective Redress: Will Portugal Show the Way?, 6 J. EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 299, 299–
300 (2015). 
 73. Zakon o kolektivnih tožbah ZkolT [Law on Collective Action], No. 55/17, http://www.pisrs.si/Pi
s.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO7399 (Slo.). 
 74. See Defense of Consumers and Users § 20 (B.O.E 1984, 26) (Spain), superseded by Consolidated 
Text of the General Law for the Defense of Consumers and Users and other complementary laws § 24 
(R.D.L. 2007, 287) (Spain).  This provision was later developed in almost every special consumer law 
issued by the Spanish legislature.  See Laura Carballo Piñeiro, La Tipicidad de las Acciones Colectivasen 
el Ordenamiento Jurídico Español, 27(3)–(4) JUSTICIA: REV. DE DERECHO PROCESAL 63, 63–65 (2007).  
The Spanish Civil Procedure Act of 2000, though, is the first attempt to systematize collective 
proceedings and its provisions (Articles 6, 11, 15, 15bis, 221, 222(2), 256(1)(6), 519). 
 75. See, e.g., Enterprise Act of 2002, c. 40, §§ 18–19 (U.K.), amending Competition Act of 1998, c. 
41, §§ 47/A–47/D (U.K.).  See also rules 19.10 & 19.11 Group Litigation Order, U.K. SI 1998/3132 Pt 
19(III). 
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half of the Member States have sanctioned collective actions, and from those who 
did, more than half chose the opt–out system while the rest stuck fully to the more 
conservative opt–in principle76 (Finland,77 Germany,78 Italy,79 Lithuania,80 Malta,81 
Poland,82 and Sweden83). 
A.  The European Landscape: An Overview 
While Europe is generally considered to feature the opt–in scheme, this 
observation is only partially valid.  On the one hand, it is true that the opt–out rule 
is generally disapproved of, evidenced by the fact that representation without 
authorization is not in place in two–thirds of the Member States.  In fact, in forty 
percent of them, no collective action is available, and traditional joinder of parties 
and assignments are the only means to bring collective claims to court.84   Twenty–
five percent of them adopted the opt–in collective action.85  Furthermore, the E.U. 
 
 76. A couple of states adopted mechanisms that may resemble collective actions but cannot be 
regarded as a means of collective civil litigation.  Although usually listed among Europe’s opt–out 
collective proceedings, the Dutch collective settlement is not considered to be a collective action, as it 
merely provides a framework for cases where the defendant concedes liability and is ready to settle.  For 
a comprehensive analysis on the Act, see Bart Krans, The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass 
Damages, 27(2) GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 281 (2014); Thijs Bosters, Collective Redress and Private 
International Law in the E.U. 47–59 (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2017).  Likewise, regimes providing 
for the disgorgement of illicitly obtained proceeds for the public budget are not regarded as collective 
actions, as they are not meant to compensate the victims.  See ACT AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION 
(GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB), § 10, Gesetz Gegen den Unlauteren Wettbewerb in 
der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 3 März 2010 (BGBl. I S. 254), last amended GESETZ VOM § 4, 
17 Feb. 2016 (BGBl. I S. 233); ACT AGAINST RESTRICTIONS OF COMPETITION (GESETZ GEGEN 
WETTBEWERBSBESCHRÄNKUNGEN), § 34(a), Gesetz Gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in der 
Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 26 Juni 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1750, 3245), last amended GESETZ VOM § 
4, 13 Okt. 2016 (BGBl. I S. 2258).  Judicial mechanisms that help coordinate the adjudication of parallel 
individual proceedings after they have been launched are also not considered to be collective actions, as 
they are not related to access to justice and are not aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of law.  See 
LAW ON MODEL PROCEEDINGS IN CAPITAL MARKET DISPUTES (GESETZ ÜBER MUSTERVERFAHREN IN 
KAPITALMARKTRECHTLICHEN STREITIGKEITEN), Aug. 16, 2005 (BGBl. I S. 2437).  See Axel Halfmeier 
& Eberhard Feess, The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG)—A European Role Model 
for Increasing the Efficiency of Capital Markets? Analysis and Suggestions for Reform (2012); Elisabeth 
Steinberger, Die Gruppenklage im Kapitalmarktrecht: Vorschläge zur Weiterentwicklung des 
Kapitalanleger—Musterverfahrensgesetzes (KapMuG) 44–132 (2016); THIJS BOSTERS, COLLECTIVE 
REDRESS AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE E.U. 27–34 (2017). 
 77. ACT ON CLASS ACTIONS [RYHMÄKANNELAKI] [CIVIL CODE] art. 444/2007 (Fin.). 
 78. GESETZ ZUR EINFÜHRUNG EINER ZIVILPROZESSUALEN MUSTERFESTSTELLUNGSKLAGE 
[MUFKLAG K.A.ABK.] [CIVIL CODE], § 119 (Ger.). 
 79. See L. 12 Luglio 2009 n. 99, Lug. 31, 2009, n.176 (It.). 
 80. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA [CIVIL CODE] c. XXIV art. 441 
(Ltu.). 
 81. ACT VI OF 2012 [COLLECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT] [CIVIL CODE] (Malta). 
 82. ACT OF 17 DECEMBER 2009 [CIVIL CODE] J. of L. of 2010 n.7, 44 (Pol.); ACT OF 7 APRIL 2017 
[CIVIL CODE], J. of L. of 2017, n. 19, 933 (Pol.).  The law was comprehensively amended by Act of 7 
April 2017 amending different laws in order to facilitate recovery of debts (Ustawa z dnia 7 kwietnia 
2017 r. o zmianie niektórych ustaw w celu ułatwienia dochodzenia wierzytelności), Journal of Laws of 
2017, item 933.  The amendments entered into force on June 1, 2017. 
 83. GROUP PROCEEDINGS ACT (SFS 2002:599) (Swed.). 
 84. NAGY, supra note 3, at 77. 
 85. Id. at 78. 
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Recommendation expresses a strong preference towards the opt–in system.86  On 
the other hand, from the seventeen Member States that created a special regime for 
collective litigation, the majority (ten Member States), one way or another, accepted 
the opt–out principle.87 
In seven Member States, solely opt–in collective actions are available.  The 
2002 Swedish Act on Group Proceedings88 was one of the first comprehensive, 
national codifications that covered the whole spectrum of civil claims.89  It created 
an opt–in system.  The Finnish Act on Collective Proceedings was adopted in 2007, 
following a fifteen–year–long debate.90  It authorizes the Consumer Ombudsman to 
launch opt–in consumer collective actions.91  Italy’s first collective action law was 
also adopted in 2007,92 then replaced in 200993 and again in 2019.94  Poland 
introduced opt–in collective actions in 2009 (Act on Pursuing Claims in Group 
Proceedings),95 but it underwent significant changes in 2017.96  Malta adopted opt–
in collective actions in 2012 in consumer, competition, and product safety matters.97  
Lithuania created an opt–in scheme of general application in 2015.98  Germany 
 
 86. Verica Trstenjak, Les Mécanismes de Recours Collectif et leur Importance pour la Protection des 
Consommateurs, in LA COUR DE JUSTICE DE L’UNION EUROPEENNE SOUS LA PRESIDENCE DE VASSILIOS 
SKOURIS (2003–2015): LIBER AMICORUM VASSILIOS SKOURIS 681 (Antonio Tizzano et al. eds., 2015). 
 87. NAGY, supra note 3, at 78. 
 88. GROUP PROCEEDINGS ACT (SFS 2002:599) (Swed.).  For a comprehensive analysis of the draft 
version, see Henrik Lindblom, Individual Litigation and Mass Justice: A Swedish Perspective and 
Proposal on Group Actions in Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 805, 824–30 (1997); Roberth Nordh, 
Group Actions in Sweden: Reflections on the Purpose of Civil Litigation, the Need for Reforms, and a 
Forthcoming Proposal, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 381, 395–402 (2001); Henrik Lindblom, 
Globalization of Class Action, NATIONAL REPORT: GROUP LITIGATION IN SWEDEN (2007); Annina H. 
Persson, Collective Enforcement: European Prospects in Light of the Swedish Experience, in 
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: ENHANCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND RECONCILING MULTILAYER INTERESTS? 
341–63 (Stefan Wrbka, Steven J. van Uytsel, & Mathias M. Siems eds., 2012). 
 89. GROUP PROCEEDINGS ACT (SFS 2002:599) §§ 1–2 (Swed.). 
 90. The Act came into force on October 1, 2007.  ACT ON CLASS ACTIONS [RYHMÄKANNAKI] [CIVIL 
CODE] art. 444/2007 § 19 (Fin.).  For an analysis on the Act, see Klaus Vittanen, Collective Litigation in 
Finland, Global Class Actions Exchange (2007). 
 91. ACT ON CLASS ACTIONS [RYHMÄKANNELAKI] [CIVIL CODE] art. 444/2007 (Fin.). 
 92. Legge 24 Dec. 2007, n. 244, Dec. 28, 2008, n. 300 (It.).  For a comprehensive analysis of the 
Italian legislation, see Remo Caponi, Collective Redress in Europe: Current Developments of ‘Class 
Action’ Suits in Italy, 16 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS INT’L [ZZPINT] 61 (2011); Remo Caponi, 
Class Action. Il Nuovo volto della Tutela Collettiva in Italia, 1987 IL FORO ITALIANO 1 (Giuffrè, 2011); 
CESARO ERNESTO & BOCCHINI FERNANDO, LA NUOVA CLASS ACTION A TUTELA DEI CONSUMATORI E 
DEGLI UTENTI (2012). 
 93. Decreto Legislativo 23 July 2009, n. 1195–b, Leggi 6 Sept. 2005 (It.).  For an overview of the 
Italian legislation, see Elisabetta Silvestri, The Globalization of Class Actions—Italian Report, GLOBAL 
CLASS ACTIONS EXCHANGE (2007); Elisabetta Silvestri, Consumers’ Collective Actions: An Update on 
Italian Draft Legislation, GLOBAL CLASS ACTIONS EXCHANGE (2007); Elisabetta Silvestri, The Italian 
‘Collective Action for Damages’: An Update, GLOBAL CLASS ACTIONS EXCHANGE (2008).  In 2012, the 
pre–requisites of collective action were softened.  Since March 25, 2012, it suffices if the rights of group 
members are “homogeneous”; they no longer have to be “identical.”  Legge 24 March 2012 no. 27.  
 94. Legge, Aprile 12, 2019 n. 31, G.U. Apr. 18, 2019, n.92 (It.).  This Article does not incorporate the 
changes introduced by this recent Italian legislation. 
 95. ACT OF 17 DECEMBER 2009 [CIVIL CODE] J. of L. of 2010 n.7, 44 (Pol.). 
 96. ACT OF 7 APRIL 2017 [CIVIL CODE], J. of L. of 2017, n.19, 933 (Pol.). 
 97. ACT VI OF 2012 [COLLECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT] [CIVIL CODE] art. 3 (Malta); ACT VI OF 2012 
[COLLECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT] [CIVIL CODE] art. 4 (Malta). 
 98. It must be noted that group actions were theoretically also available before 2015.  Section 49(6) 
of the Lithuanian Code of Civil Procedure, introduced in 2003, provided for group actions when 
necessary to protect the public interest.  CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA 
[CIVIL CODE] c. V art. 49(6) (Ltu.).  However, as confirmed by ruling Nr. 2–492/2009 of the Court of 
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introduced a “model declaratory claim” (Musterfeststellungsklage),  an opt–in 
scheme available in consumer matters, in 2018.99  Technically, German courts have 
no power to award damages.  Instead, they may enter a declaratory judgment as to 
the pre–conditions of liability,100 and group members may seek individual monetary 
relief on the basis of this judicial determination.101 
There are ten Member States that have an opt–out scheme.  Led by the 
consideration to limit representation without authorization to cases where this is 
inevitable, four of these Member States leave the choice between opt–in and opt–
out to the presiding judge.102  This is in line with the Recommendation on Collective 
Redress, which provides that “[a]ny exception to [the opt–in] principle, by law or 
by court order, should be duly justified by reasons of sound administration of 
justice.”103 
The 2007 Danish collective action law authorizes the court to decide whether 
to carry out the action in the opt–in or the opt–out scheme.104  The court chooses 
the opt–out pattern if individual litigation is not feasible due to a claim’s low 
monetary value.105  Similarly, in Belgium,106 the choice between the opt–in and the 
opt–out scheme is at the court’s discretion.107  The U.K. introduced collective 
actions in 2015 in the field of competition law,108 where the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal (“CAT”) decides whether the procedure will be carried out in the opt–in 
 
Appeal of Lithuania, this provision could not be put into practice because it was not accompanied by an 
effective implementation mechanism.  Court of Appeal of Lithuania, 2009, case Nr. 2–492/2009.  
Chapter XXIV1 on Collective Redress was inserted into the Code of Civil Procedure and came into 
effect on January 1, 2015, repealing Section 49(6).  CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
LITHUANIA [CIVIL CODE] c. XXIV art. 441 (Ltu.). 
 99. It was inserted as Book 6 (Sections 606–614) in the Code of Civil Procedure 
(Zivilprozessordnung).  See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] §§ 606–14 
(Ger.); see Hans–Bernd Schäfer, Musterfeststellungsklage: Ein Schritt in die Richtige Richtung, 98(7) 
WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST 456 (2018). 
 100. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] § 606(1) (Ger.). 
 101. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] § 613(1) (Ger.). 
 102. For a scholarly proposal suggesting that the choice between the opt–in and the opt–out scheme 
should be made dependent on the sum of the claims, see Karl–Alexander Neumann & Landon Wade 
Magnusson, Pour Une Class–Action Européenne Dans Le Droit de la Concurrence, 24(2) REV. 
QUÉBÉCOISE DE DROIT INT’L 149, 169–170 (2011). 
 103. 2013 O.J. (L 201) 26.7. 
 104. STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURAL LAW (RETSPLEJERÅDET) [CIV. CODE] art. 1468/2005 
(Den.).  For an English summary of the Danish legislation, see Erik Werlauff, Class Actions in 
Denmark—From 2008, GLOBAL CLASS ACTIONS EXCHANGE 3 (2008). 
 105. Peter Møgelvang–Hansen, Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Collective Redress 
Mechanisms in the European Union: Country–Report Denmark, in EVALUATION OF THE 
EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS MECHANISMS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION BERLIN: CIVIC CONSULTING 47 (2008); Peter Arnt Nielsen & Karin Linhart, Danish Class 
Actions—A European Model?, 5(3) INT’L. J. PRIV. L. 229, 236 (2012). 
 106. See Jacques Laffineur & Grégory Renier, L’action en Réparation Collective: Un Premier état des 
Lieux Deux ans Après son Introduction en droit Belge, (112) DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION–
CONSUMENTENRECHT 3 (2016). 
 107. For an overview, see Sofia Oliveira Paris, Private Antitrust Enforcement: A New Era for Collective 
Redress, 8 Y.B. ANTITRUST & REG. STUD. 11, 23 (2015).  However, group members residing habitually 
or having their principal place of business outside Belgium are covered only if they opt in.  CODE OF 
ECONOMIC LAW [C. CIV.] art. XVII.38 and XVII.43 (Belg.).  Furthermore, only the opt–in scheme may 
be used in cases of physical and moral damages.  CODE OF ECONOMIC LAW [C. CIV.] art. XVII.43 
(Belg.). 
 108. Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15 (Eng.).  For a comprehensive analysis, see Barry J. Rodger, The 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 and Collective Redress for Competition Law Infringements in the U.K.: A 
Class Act?, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 258 (2015). 
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or the opt–out scheme.109  Yet, the Competition Act does not set out the 
considerations that should determine this choice.  The Competition Appeal Tribunal 
Rules of 2015 list two factors: “the strength of the claims” and “whether it is 
practicable for the proceedings to be brought as opt–in collective proceedings, 
having regard to all the circumstances, including the estimated amount of damages 
that individual class members may recover.”110  The CAT’s 2015 Guide to 
proceedings111 amplifies these requirements.  Without carrying out a full merits 
assessment: 
[The CAT] will usually expect the strength of the claims to be more 
immediately perceptible in an opt–out than an opt–in case, since in the 
latter case, the class members have chosen to be part of the proceedings 
and may be presumed to have conducted their own assessment of the 
strength of their claim. . . .  For example, where the claims seek damages 
for the consequence of an infringement which is covered by a decision of 
a competition authority (follow–on claims), they will generally be of 
sufficient strength for the purpose of this criterion.112 
As to whether it is practicable for the proceedings to be brought in the opt–in 
scheme, the CAT “will consider all the circumstances, including the estimated 
amount of damages that individual class members may recover in determining 
whether it is practicable for the proceedings to be certified as opt–in.”113  It bears 
emphasizing that “[t]here is a general preference for proceedings to be opt–in where 
practicable.”114  Opt–in proceedings may be justified, if the class is small and 
individual losses high, or if class members can be easily identified and contacted.115  
In Slovenia, the law on collective actions adopted in 2017116 leaves the choice 
between opt–in and opt–out to the court.117  The opt–in system has to be used if 
 
 109. 1998 Competition Act, c. 41, § 47/B(7)(c) (Eng.).  It is worth noting that class members domiciled 
outside the U.K. must opt–in, even if the CAT chose the opt–out scheme for the case.  See 1998 
Competition Act, c. 41, §§ 47/B(10)–(11) (Eng.). 
 110. Guide to Proceedings, Competition Appeal Tribunal § 6.39, https://www.catribunal.org.uk/sites/
default/files/2017-12/guide_to_proceedings_2015.pdf (Eng.). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Law on Collective Actions (Zakon o kolektivnih tožbah—ZkolT), OFFICIAL J. REP. SLOVENIA. 
No. 55/2017.  See Jorg Sladič, Slovenian Law on Collective Actions: A Legal Transplant in Post Socialist 
Legal System, (3) EUROPEAN J. CONSUMER L. 417 (2016); Jorg Sladič, Das Slowenische Gesetz über 
Sammelklagen, 22(1) ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS 137 (2017). 
 117. Article 29 of the Slovenian Law on Collective Actions.  See British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, State of Collective Redress in the E.U. in the Context of the Implementation of the 
Commission Recommendation, JUST/2016/JCOO/FW/CIVI/0099 14–15 (Nov. 2017), https://www.biic
l.org/documents/1881_StudyontheStateofCollectiveRedress.pdf?showdocument=1; Jorg Sladič, A New 
Model of Civil Litigation in Slovenia: Is the Slovenian Judiciary Prepared for the Challenges Presented 
by the New Law on Collective Actions?, in TRANSFORMATION OF CIVIL JUSTICE: UNITY AND DIVERSITY 
213, 214 (Alan Uzelac & Cornelis Hendrik Remco van Rhee eds., 2018). 
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non–pecuniary damages are involved or if at least ten percent of group members 
have claims in a value exceeding 2,000 Euros.118 
Seven Member States established a statutory right to opt–out collective 
action.119  Greece introduced opt–out consumer collective actions very early, in 
1994,120 and authorized consumer protection organizations to claim damages.  The 
Portuguese collective action law dates back to 1995 and has a constitutional basis.121  
It has a general application and enables actions for any civil claim.122  Spanish law123 
contains a hybrid opt–in–opt–out scheme with a restricted sectoral approach.124  In 
Hungary, opt–out collective action mechanisms exist in competition and consumer 
protection law.125  The Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure also contains an opt–in 
joint action scheme concerning certain matters such as consumer protection, 
employment, and environmental damages.126  Bulgaria adopted an opt–out class 
action scheme of general application in its Code of Civil Procedure of 2007.127  The 
 
 118. Nonetheless, even if the opt–out system is chosen by the court, group members not domiciled in 
Slovenia can become part of the proceedings only if they opt in.  Article 30 of the Slovenian Law on 
Collective Actions. 
 119. As  noted  above,  the  U.K.  also,  in  the  field  of  competition  law,  leaves  the  decision  between 
the  opt–in  and  opt–out  scheme  to  the  judge.  British  Institute  of  International  and  Comparative 
Law,  State  of  Collective  Redress  in  the  E.U.  in  the  Context  of  the  Implementation  of  the 
Commission Recommendation, JUST/2016/JCOO/FW/CIVI/0099 16 (Nov. 2017), https://www.biicl 
.org/documents/1881_StudyontheStateofCollectiveRedress.pdf?showdocument=1. 
 120. Law 2251/1994 on Consumers’ Protection art. 10(16)–(29) (Gr.). 
 121. CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION] art. 52(3) (Pt.). 
 122. The general rules on popular actions (acção popular) are included in Act 83/95, and there are 
special provisions in particular fields.  See, e.g., Law No. 19/2014 of 14 April on Environment Policy 
(Port.); Law No. 24/96 of 31 July on Consumer Protection Act (Port.); Law No. 107/2001 of 8 September 
on Cultural Heritage (Port.); Securities Code and Law 23/2018 of 5 June on Antitrust Damages Actions 
(Port.). 
 123. LEY DE ENJUICIAMENTO CIVIL [L.E. CIV.] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] art. 11 (Spain).  For an 
English translation of the Spanish provisions, see Pablo Gutiérrez de Cabiedes Hidalgo, Spanish 
Legislation on Collective Actions: Selected Excerpts (2007), http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites
/default/files/documents/Spain_Legislation.pdf.  For an analysis of the Spanish system, see Pablo 
Gutiérrez de Cabiedes Hidalgo, Group Litigation in Spain, National Report (2007), 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/spain_national_report.pdf.  
Collective 
actions have been part of Spanish law since 1984.  See Laura Carballo Piñeiro, Consumer Collective 
Arbitration in Spain. What’s in a Name?, in CLASS AND GROUP ACTIONS IN ARBITRATION.  DOSSIERS 
ICC INSTITUTE OF WORLD BUSINESS LAW 88 (Bernard Hanotiau & Eric A. Schwarz eds., 2016). 
 124. This scheme applies to consumer matters.  See Fernando Gomez & Marian Gili, Country–Report 
Spain, EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS MECHANISMS 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 6–7 (2008).  In 2007, a similar provision was inserted as to matters concerning 
equal treatment between men and women.  Section 11bis introduced by L.O. 3/2007, de 22 de Marzo, 
para la igualdad efectiva de mujeres y hombres («B.O.E.» 23 Marzo). 
 125. Magyar Közlöny [Hungarian Official Gazette], art. 85/A (1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen 
piaci magatartás és a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról); see also §§ 38–38/A (1997. évi CLV. törvény a 
fogyasztóvédelemről). 
 126. Polgári Perrendtartás [Civil Procedure Code] §§ 580–591 (2018) (Hung.). 
 127. Promulgated in State Gazette No. 59/20.07.2007, amended and supplemented by SG No. 
50/30.05.2008, modified by Judgment No. 3 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria of 
8.07.2008–SG No. 63/15.07.2008, amended by SG No. 69/5.08.2008.  The class action provisions can 
be found CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF BULGARIA, Ch. 33, §§ 379–88.  Courts continuously apply 
high requirements on class formation and representation, effectively transforming the procedure into an 
opt–in system, with the exception of where the plaintiff is a public authority (the Commission on 
Consumer Protection) or a representative consumer association pursuing injunctive measures.  Tatiana 
Markova, Колективните искове: екс анте анализ на предявяването им в България [Collective 
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French Consumer Code (Code de la Consommation) contains two patterns of 
collective action where monetary relief may be sought.  First, in 1992, an opt–in 
scheme was inserted into the Consumer Code (action en représentation 
conjointe)128 and, subsequently, extended to other matters (e.g., investor 
protection129 and environmental protection).130  Second, and more importantly, in 
2014, the French legislature created an opt–out collective action regime in the 
Consumer Code (action de groupe), which was later extended to healthcare matters 
and, in 2016, converted into a general scheme also applicable to discrimination, 
environmental protection, and personal data.131  English law contains three 
mechanisms of collective litigation: representative proceedings, group litigation 
orders,132 and competition law collective actions.  Although representative 
proceedings may be carried out in the opt–out scheme, they remained ineffective 
due to the strict construction of the preconditions in the case–law.133 
B.  Purview and Scope: A Sectoral Approach 
Most European collective action laws have a limited (sectoral) purview,134 
reflecting the notion that collective actions should be confined to cases where there 
is a pressing need for them.  In Greece,135 Finland,136 Germany,137 and Italy,138 
 
Claims: Ex Ante Analysis of Claim Submissions in Bulgaria], (1) [Икономически и социални 
алтернативи [ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ALTERNATIVES] 142 (2015). 
 128. Consumer Protection Law, Loi n° 92–60, 18 Janv. 1992 devenue les articles L. 422–1 à L. 422–3 
du Code de la Consommation, réd. Loi 93–949, 26 juillet 1993; R. 422–1 à 422–10, réd. Décr. 92–1306, 
11 Décembre 1992 (Fr.). 
 129. L452–2 of the Monetary and Financial Code.  See Véronique Magnier & Ralf Alleweldt, Country–
Report France, in EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS 
MECHANISMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 7–9 (2008). 
 130. This appeared to be less efficient given that it produced, in the first one and a half decades of its 
history, only a few cases.  See Véronique Magnier, Class Actions, Group Litigation & Other Forms of 
Collective Litigation—France (2007), http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/docume
nts/France_National_Report.pdf. 
 131. Law on Group Actions, Loi n° 2014–344 du 17 Mars 2014 Relative à la Consommation et Décr. 
2014–1081 du 24 Sept. 2014 Relatif à l’action de Groupe en Matière de Consommation; Loi n° 2016–
41 du 26 Janv. 2016 de Modernisation de notre Système de santé et Décr. 2016–1249 du 26 Sept. 2016 
Relatif à l’action de Groupe en Matière de santé; Loi 2016–1547 du 18 Novembre 2016 de 
Modernisation de la Justice du XXIe Siècle, JORF 0269 du 19 Novembre 2016 texte 1. 
 132. For an analysis of group litigation orders, see RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN 
COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 94–111 (2014). 
 133. See Neil Andrews, Multi–Party Proceedings in England: Representative and Group Actions, 
11(2) DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 249, 253 (2001). 
 134. Commission Report on the implementation of the Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 
on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member 
States concerning violations of rights granted under Union law (2013/396/EU), COM (2018) 40 final, 3.  
 135. Dimitris Emvalomenos, E.U. Collective Redress Project, Oxford, 12–13 December 2016, 2. 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/greece.docx (Greece); British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, State of Collective Redress in the E.U. in the Context of the Implementation of the 
Commission Recommendation, JUST/2016/JCOO/FW/CIVI/0099 181 (Nov. 2017). 
 136. Act on Class Actions, § 4 (2007) (Fin.). 
 137. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] § 606(1) (Ger.). 
 138. Act 244 of 24 December 2007 and Act 99 of 23 July 2009, http://www.tedioli.com/Italian_class_
action_text_english_version.pdf.  Section 140bis (2) of the Italian Consumer Code; Giulia Principe, 
Italian Class Actions. An Update (2012), http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/docum 
ents/Italian%20Class%20Actions%20Principe.pdf.  Recently, in Adusbef v. Monte dei Paschi di Siena, 
the court of appeals of Florence held that retail investors are not consumers and, hence, are not covered 
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collective actions are available only in consumer matters.  The purview of Maltese 
collective actions is confined to competition, consumer protection, and product 
safety law.139  The Slovenian regime on collective actions applies to consumer, 
competition, securities, labor, and environmental law matters.140  Hungary 
introduced opt–out class actions in 1996 in the Competition Act and again in 1997 
in the Consumer Protection Act.141  The new Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure, 
having gone into effect on January 1, 2018, introduced an opt–in scheme applicable 
to consumer, employment and environmental tort matters.142 
Some Member States have used “leapfrogging” to extend the scheme to other 
sectors, demonstrating the cautious approach of European legal systems as to 
collective litigation.  Spanish class–action rules143 apply to consumer matters,144 but 
in 2007, a similar provision was inserted as to gender–based discrimination.145  The 
Polish regime introduced in 2009146 initially applied only to consumer law, product 
liability, and tort liability (with the exception of the protection of personal interests) 
but was extended in 2017 to claims resulting from the non–performance or defective 
performance of an obligation, unjust enrichment, and certain infringements of 
personal interests (bodily injury or health disorder).147  After the introduction of 
group actions in the field of consumer protection in 2014148 and health care in 
January 2016,149 the French legislature created a general framework for group 
actions in November 2016150 that extended the purview of the mechanism to 
discrimination, environmental protection, personal data, and healthcare matters.151 
 
by the Italian class action legislation.  Giorgio Afferni, ‘Opt–In’ Class Actions in Italy: Why are They 
Failing?, 7(1) J. EUROPEAN TORT L. 82, 85 (2016). 
 139. Collective Proceedings Act, art. 3–4 (2012) (Malta). 
 140. See Jorg Sladič, A New Model of Civil Litigation in Slovenia: Is the Slovenian Judiciary Prepared 
for the Challenges Presented by the New Law on Collective Actions?, in TRANSFORMATION OF CIVIL 
JUSTICE: UNITY AND DIVERSITY 213, 214 (Alan Uzelac et al. eds., 2018); British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, State of Collective Redress in the E.U. in the Context of the 
Implementation of the Commission Recommendation, JUST/2016/JCOO/FW/CIVI/0099 249 (Nov. 
2017).  Article 2(2) refers to anti–discrimination disputes, but it also provides that in this regard only 
collective injunctions are permissible. 
 141. 1997. évi CLV. törvény a fogyasztóvédelemről (Act CLV of 1997 on Consumer Protection). 
 142. Polgári Perrendtartás [Civil Procedure Code] §§ 580–91 (2018) (Hung.). 
 143. LEY DE ENJUICIAMENTO CIVIL [L.E. CIV.] (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE) art. 11 (Spain). 
 144. Fernando Gomez & Marian Gili, Country–Report Spain, in EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS 
AND EFFICIENCY OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS MECHANISMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 6–7 (2008). 
 145. LEY DE ENJUICIAMENTO CIVIL [L.E. CIV.] (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE) art. 11 (Spain). 
 146. Act on Class Actions of 17 December 2009 [Ustawa o dochodzeniu roszczeń w postępowaniu 
grupowym], Journal of Laws of 2010, no 7; item 44, 1 (Pol.). 
 147. New Sections 1(2) and 1(2)(a)–(b) of the Polish Act on Class Actions. 
 148. Loi 2014–344 du 17 Mars 2014 relative à la consommation et Décr. 2014–1081 du 24 Sept. 2014 
relatif à l’action de groupe en matière de consommation (Fr.). 
 149. Loi 2016–41 du 26 Janv. 2016 de modernisation de notre système de santé et Décr. 2016–1249 du 
26 Sept. 2016 relatif à l’action de groupe en matière de santé (2016) (Fr.). 
 150. Loi 2016–1547 du 18 Novembre 2016 de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle, JORF 0269 
du 19 Novembre 2016 texte 1 (2016) (Fr.). 
 151. Loi 2014–344 du 17 Mars 2014 relative à la consommation et Décr. 2014–1081 du 24 Sept. 2014 
relatif à l’action de groupe en matière de consommation; Loi n° 2016–41 du 26 Janv. 2016 de 
modernisation de notre système de santé et Décr. 2016–1249 du 26 Sept. 2016 relatif à l’action de groupe 
en matière de santé; Loi 2016–1547 du 18 Novembre 2016 de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle, 
JORF 0269 du 19 Novembre 2016 texte 1 (Fr.). 
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In Belgium, collective actions were initially available only for consumers, but 
in 2018, they were extended to small and medium–sized enterprises (“SMEs”).152  
The regime applies to cases where an enterprise153 breaches one of its contractual 
obligations or violates one of the Belgian or European laws enumerated in the Code 
of Economic Law (Code de droit économique).154  These extend to fields like 
banking, competition law, consumer protection, energy, insurance, intellectual 
property, passengers’ rights, payment and credit services, privacy, product safety, 
and professional liability.155 
In English law, opt–out representative proceedings have been traditionally 
available, though they remained ineffective due to the strict construction of the 
preconditions in the judicial practice.156  After introducing a general opt–in 
procedural tool (group litigation order),157 the English government rejected the 
introduction of an opt–out scheme of general application and decided to introduce 
this mechanism on a sector–by–sector basis.158  As a result, an opt–out scheme was 
made available in competition matters.159 
A few Member States have class action regimes of general application.  The 
2002 Swedish law on group proceedings covers the whole spectrum of civil claims, 
as opposed to only specific sectors or branches of law.160  Likewise, the Portuguese 
collective action law of 1995 has a general application and enables actions for any 
civil claim, albeit special provisions can be found also in particular fields (e.g., Law 
No. 19/2014 of April 14 on Environment Policy; Law No. 24/96 of July 31 on 
Consumer Protection Act; Law No. 107/2001 of September 8 on Cultural Heritage, 
Securities Code; and Law 23/2018 of June 5 on Antitrust Damages Actions).  The 
Bulgarian opt–out collective action scheme inserted into the Code of Civil 
Procedure of 2007 also covers all violations of law, although the case–law has the 
tendency to limit the scope to injunctive measures concerning consumer disputes.161  
The Lithuanian system introduced in 2015 is also of general application.162  The 
Danish rules on collective actions that went into effect on January 1, 2008 
introduced a generally applicable system where it is up to the judge to decide 
whether to approve the collective action under the opt–in or the opt–out scheme.163 
 
 152. Loi portant modification, en ce qui concerne l’extension de l’action en réparation collective aux 
P.M.E., du Code de droit Économique.  22 May 2018, Moniteur Belge (M.B.) (Official Gazette of 
Belgium) (22 May 2018). See Renier G. (2018). 
 153. Article I.21 of the Belgian Code of Economic Law defines enterprise as a group of consumers or 
SMEs, while Articles XVII.36 and XVII.38 refer to a violation committed by an enterprise. 
 154. Code de Droit Économique [CEL] art. XVII.37 (Belg.). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Andrews, supra note 133, at 253. 
 157. See Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt–Out Class Action for European Member States: A 
Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409, 427–31 (2009). 
 158. The Government’s Response to the Civil Justice Council’s Report, Improving Access to Justice 
Through Collective Actions (2009).  See Christopher Hodges, Collective Redress in Europe: The New 
Model, 2010/7 CIV. JUST. Q. 370, 377 (2010); Christopher Hodges, From Class Actions to Collective 
Redress: A Revolution in Approach to Compensation, 28 CIV. JUST. Q. 41, 50–66 (2009). 
 159. Competition Act 1998, c. IV, §§ 47A–49E (Eng.); Consumer Rights Act, sch 8, (Eng.). 
 160. Group Proceedings Act §§1–2 (SFS 2002:599) (Swed.). 
 161. Alexander Katzarsky & Georgi Georgiev, Chapter 11: Bulgaria, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO CLASS & GROUP ACTIONS 2013 64 ¶ 1.2 (Ian Dodds–Smith & Alison 
Brown eds., 2012). 
 162. The Republic of Lithuania Civil Procedure Code, art. 441 § 1 (2014). 
 163. CSONGAR ISTVAN NAGY, COLLECTIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPE—A COMPARATIVE, ECONOMIC AND 
TRANSSYSTEMIC ANALYSIS 81 ¶ 4 (2019). 
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C.  Prerequisites of Collective Action:                                          
Superiority and Definability 
In Europe, the pre–requisites of collective actions normally encompass U.S. 
law’s requirements of class certification (numerosity, commonality, typicality and 
adequate representation).164  Some of the laws do not specify all these requirements, 
perhaps because, owing to the rules on scope and standing, such a specification 
might appear redundant.  Quite a few systems limit the availability of collective 
actions to consumer matters where it is assumed that a number of victims are 
concerned and their small claims would be difficult to bring to court but for 
collective litigation.165  Similarly, several systems lean towards ensuring adequate 
representation through limiting standing to public entities and recognized civil 
organizations or granting these plaintiffs a privileged status.166  The peculiar traits 
of European collective actions are given by the pre–conditions that go beyond the 
 
 164. For instance, in France, opt–out collective actions may be launched if numerous persons 
(numerosity) placed in a similar situation suffer damages caused by the same person, the common cause 
of which is a similar breach of legal or contractual obligations (commonality).  Article 62 of Loi n° 
2016–1547 du 18 Novembre 2016 de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle (“Lorsque plusieurs 
personnes placées dans une situation similaire subissent un dommage causé par une même personne, 
ayant pour cause commune un manquement de même nature à ses obligations légales ou contractuelles, 
une action de groupe peut être exercée en justice au vu des cas individuels présentés par le demandeur.”).  
Under Greek law, consumers’ associations may bring consumer collective actions “for the protection of 
the general interests of the consuming public” or if “an illegal behavior hurts the interests of at least 
thirty (30) consumers.”  Articles 10(16) of Law 2251/1994 on Consumers’ Protection .  In Poland, the 
court certifies a collective action if the following conditions are met: numerosity (the group shall consist 
at least of 10 people); commonality (the class action has to cover claims of the same kind and with the 
same or similar factual basis).  The Polish Act contains an idiosyncratic requirement which may be 
regarded as an emanation of the requirement of commonality: if a suit concerns a monetary claim, a 
collective action may be launched only if the amounts claimed by individual group members are equal; 
however, representative plaintiffs may obviate the problems emerging from this requirement through 
forming sub–classes and requesting a declaratory judgment.  Polish Act on Pursuing Claims in Group 
Proceedings, §§ 1(1), 2(1), & 2(2). 
 165. For example, although Spanish law attaches high importance to definability, it does not specify 
the pre–conditions of collective actions in consumer matters.  See Fernando Gomez & Marian Gili, 
Country–Report Spain, in EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF COLLECTIVE 
REDRESS MECHANISMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 6 (2008). 
 166. In Hungary, the Competition Act and the Consumer Protection Act have no express requirement 
as to the adequacy of representation but confer standing solely on public bodies and recognized consumer 
rights organizations (on the Hungarian Competition Office as to the Competition Act and on the 
consumer protection agency, the public prosecutor, and consumer rights organizations as to the 
Consumer Protection Act).  1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a 
versenykorlátozás tilalmáról (Act LVII of 1996 on the Law Prohibiting Unfair Market Conduct and 
Restrictions on Competition of 1996, § 85/A); 1997. évi CLV. törvény a fogyasztóvédelemről (Act CLV 
of 1997 on the Law of Consumer Protection, § 38–39).  In Germany, model declaratory claims may be 
submitted only by qualified consumer protection organizations.  It is noteworthy that heightened 
requirements apply here: in addition to the conditions applicable to organizations eligible to launch 
actions for an injunction, organizations engaging in actions for compensation need to fulfill extra 
requirements (adequate representation).  German Code of Civil Procedure § 606(3)1.  “Furthermore, the 
matter is eligible if, at the time of submission, it is substantiated that it concerns at least 10 consumers 
and, within two months after the procedure’s publication, at least 50 consumers register their cases 
(numerosity).”  NAGY, supra note 3 (translating Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] 606 ¶ 3 
(Ger.)). 
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American quadriga.  These extra requirements are the reflections of the European 
fears and special considerations set out above.167 
Most European collective action laws require that the collective action be 
expedient or superior to individual litigation.  The requirement of expediency is met 
if the collective action is an appropriate means to enforce the claims of group 
members.  Superiority goes beyond this expectation and requires that a collective 
action be more expedient than individual litigation.  This reflects the notion that 
collective actions have imminent dangers; hence, their use must be limited to cases 
where they are truly necessary.  Simply stated, the law tolerates collective actions 
only if proven expedient or more effective than individual litigation. 
In Malta, the court certifies the action168 if the collective proceedings “are the 
most appropriate means for the fair and efficient resolution of the common 
issues.”169  In Sweden, the institution of the collective action is subject to the 
condition that:  
[G]roup proceedings do not appear to be inappropriate owing to some 
claims of the members of the group, as regards grounds, differing 
substantially from other claims, [and] the larger part of the claims to which 
the action relates cannot equally well be pursued by personal actions by 
the members of the group.170   
In Finland, collective proceedings may be launched if “the hearing of the case as a 
class action is expedient in view of the size of the class, the subject–matter of the 
claims presented in it and the proof offered in it.”171  In Denmark, a collective action 
may be initiated if it is the best mechanism to settle the claims.  This condition is 
met if the collective action is more expedient than traditional joinder of parties.172  
Under the new Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure, the court may decline a request 
for certification if it was not reasonable to certify the collective action.  Class 
certification should be denied if the burden in terms of work and time related to the 
collective nature of the action would outweigh the efficiency benefits of the 
collective proceedings.173  In Lithuania, a collective action may be launched if “it is 
a more expedient, effective and appropriate means of resolving the particular 
dispute than individual actions.”174  In U.K. competition law, although the statutory 
language does not go beyond the requirement of suitability (the CAT may certify a 
collective action175 if the claims “are suitable to be brought in collective 
 
 167. In Italy, a collective action may be launched only if the group has a prima facie case (the claim is 
not manifestly unfounded).  § 140–bis(6) Codice di Commercio [C. Comm.] (It.). 
 168. Collective Proceedings Act § 9(1) (2012) (Malta). 
 169. As to superiority, among others, the following circumstances need to be taken into account: “(a) 
the benefits of the proposed collective proceedings; and (b) the nature of the class.”  Id. at § 9(2). 
 170. Group Proceedings Act § 2 (SFS 2002:599) (Swed.). 
 171. Act on Class Actions § 2 (440/2007) (Fin.). 
 172. Peter Møgelvang–Hansen, Country–Report Denmark, in EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS 
AND EFFICIENCY OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS MECHANISMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 4 (2008). 
 173. Code of Civ. P. § 585 (2016) (Hung.) (the explanatory memorandum confirms that this is a 
superiority requirement, as the court has to investigate whether the joint action is more efficient than 
pursing the claims individually). 
 174. The Republic of Lithuanian Civil Procedure Code, art. 441, § 1–2 (2014). 
 175. For an analysis of the CAT’s decision practice, see generally Cento Velkanovcki, Collective 
Certification in U.K. Competition Law: Commonality, Costs and Funding, 42 WORLD COMPETITION 
121 (2019). 
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proceedings”),176 the Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules of 2015 contain a list of 
factors to be taken into account as to the interpretation of the requirement of 
suitability.177  These factors suggest that collective proceedings may be certified 
only if they are more efficient than individual actions (superiority).178  In Belgium, 
a collective action may be certified only if it is more effective than individual 
litigation.179  As to the superiority of collective litigation, the court may consider 
the size of the group, the relationship between individual damages and collective 
harm, and the collective action’s complexity and efficiency.180 
A similarly motivated requirement is definability.  As noted above, due to the 
difficulties related to the identification of group members and the distribution of 
monetary relief, there is a general distrust, chiefly concerning opt–out collective 
actions, as to the feasibility of collective redress in terms of actually delivering 
individual relief.  The general concern is that the mechanism serves the financial 
interests of law firms more than those of group members.  The requirement of 
definability responds to these concerns. 
In Bulgaria, a collective action may be launched if group members are 
identifiable.181  In Finland, it is a prerequisite that “the class has been defined with 
adequate precision.”182  In Denmark, it is a requirement that group members are 
identifiable and may be informed in an appropriate manner.183  In Hungary, the 
Competition Act and the Consumer Protection Act require that the victims of the 
violation be identifiable on the basis of the circumstances of the violation.184  
Spanish law also embeds the requirement of definability in certain cases.185  In 
England, courts have been reluctant to endorse representative proceedings where 
group members were not readily ascertainable.186  If the damages suffered by the 
group and the loss sustained by individual group members are not ascertainable, 
claims for damages may be pursued in a two–stage procedure where, in the first 
phase, a declaratory judgment is requested with respect to issues group members 
have in common, followed by group members’ individual actions for damages.187  
In competition law, the CAT may certify188 a collective action (also known as a 
collective proceedings order, or “CPO”), if the claims “are brought on behalf of an 
identifiable class of persons” (definability).189  In Merricks v Mastercard, Inc.,190 
 
 176. Competition Act 1998, c. IV, §§ 47B(6) (1998) (Eng.). 
 177. Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules § 79(3) (2015) (Eng.). 
 178. The CAT takes into account not only whether the collective action is “an appropriate means for 
the fair and efficient resolution of the common issues,” but also its costs and benefits, whether individual 
actions have already been commenced, and the size and nature of the group.  Competition Appeal 
Tribunal Rules § 79(2) (2015) (Eng.). 
 179. Code de Droit Économique [CEL] art. XVII.37 (Belg.). 
 180. Stefaan Voet, Class Action Developments in Belgium, STANFORD (Apr. 2017), 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/BELGIUM.pdf. 
 181. Bulgarian Code of Civil Procedure art. 379(1) (2008) (Bulg.). 
 182. § 2 Act on Class Actions (440/2007) (Fin.). 
 183. Peter Møgelvang–Hansen, supra note 172, at 4. 
 184. Act LVII of 1996 on the Law Prohibiting Unfair Market Conduct and Restrictions on Competition 
of 1996, § 85/A (Hung.). 
 185. Gomez & Gili, supra note 165, at 6. 
 186. See Emerald Supplies Ltd. & Anor v. British Airways Plc [2009] EWHC 741, ¶ 37 (Ch) (Eng.). 
 187. Prudential Assurance Co. v. Newman Indus. Ltd., 2 WLR 339 (Ch 1980) (Eng.). 
 188. For an analysis of the CAT’s decision practice, see Cento Velkanovcki, Collective Certification 
in U.K. Competition Law: Commonality, Costs and Funding, 42 WORLD COMPETITION 121 (2019). 
 189. Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules § 79(1)(a) (2015) (Eng.). 
 190. Merricks v. Mastercard, Inc. [2019] EWCA Civ 674, [2019] Bus LR 3025, [2019] WLR(D) 239. 
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the Court of Appeals held that the certification of a claim and the grant of a CPO 
may not be refused merely because individual losses cannot be ascertained.191 
The extra requirements seem to have a higher significance in opt–out 
proceedings.  They are expected to be more expedient than individual actions, and 
definability plays a much more important role here, as group members are 
unknown, necessitating that the beneficiaries be identified on the basis of the final 
judgment’s group definition.  Of course, legal counsel may go as far as possible 
with the common questions, to the extent permitted by the definability of the group.  
For instance, they may request the court establish the legal basis (defendant’s 
liability) but leave quantum to collective actions covering sub–classes or to 
individual litigation.  In this sense, due to the requirements of superiority, 
expediency, and definability, the purview of European collective actions is more 
restricted than that of its U.S. counterpart. 
D.  Non–Profit Civil Organizations:                                                    
Heroes of Collective Actions 
In Europe, the heroes of collective actions are non–profit civil organizations.  
As a result of the distrust of incentive–driven, market–based mechanisms and the 
notion that collective actions’ chief purpose is not the enforcement of public policy, 
European legislators have been reluctant to vest for–profit private entities with the 
power to launch collective proceedings.  The general attitude is that financial 
incentives may provide a stimulus that is not reconcilable with the public interest.192  
The consequence of this attitude is that the main authors of collective actions are 
non–profit organizations presumed to be free of reprehensible incentives.193 
In some Member States, standing is formally reserved194 for public entities 
(administrative agencies, the attorney general, etc.) and qualified non–profit civil 
organizations such as consumer protection non–governmental organizations 
 
 191. Id. ¶ 60. 
 192. See Commission Communication Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective 
Redress § 3.9, COM (2013) 401 final (June 11, 2013). 
 193. See Duncan Fairgrieve & Geraint Howells, Collective Redress Procedures—European Debates, 
58 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 379, 400, 407 (2009) (arguing that the European model regards “public agencies 
or accredited consumer organizations as a gatekeeper to a system of collective redress.”). 
 194. But see CODICE DEL CONSUMO [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 140 bis (It.) (codifying that collective 
action may be initiated by any consumer, or authorized consumer organization, as standing goes to the 
consumer who initiated the procedure). 
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(“NGOs”).195  In quite a few Member States, non–profit civil organizations 
dominate the field, though group members also have standing.196 
According to European thinking, conferring standing on these public and not–
for–profit organizations with the exclusion of group members and for–profit entities 
mitigates the risk of abuse.  It is argued that because these organizations are not 
profit–oriented, they are attentive to the public interest.  Furthermore, they are 
registered, regulated, and supervised.  There is a clear tendency to reserve “hard 
cases” (which are difficult to manage or raise higher risks of abuse) for public 
entities and recognized civil organizations.  Such cases involve opt–out proceedings 
and cases where it is difficult to define the group. 
The E.U. Recommendation suggests restricting group representation to non–
profit entities and public authorities.197  In Hungary, opt–in procedures launched 
under the new Code of Civil Procedure confer standing on group members.  Opt–
out collective actions under the Competition Act and the Consumer Protection Act 
may be launched by the competition authority and the consumer protection agency, 
or the public prosecutor and consumer rights organizations, respectively.  Under 
 
 195. See RYHMÄKANNELAKI [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] § 4 (Fin.) (where the Consumer Ombudsman has 
the power to institute a collective action); LOI n° 2016–1547 du 18 Novembre 2016 de modernisation 
de la justice du XXIe siècle [Law 2016–1547 of November 18, 2016 on the Modernization of 21st 
Century Justice], J. OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], 
Nov. 19, 2016, art. 63 (codifying that only recognized civil associations whose object extends to the 
protection of the interests at stake may institute opt–out proceedings); ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] 
[Code of Civil Procedure] § 606, ¶ 1 (Ger.) (model declaratory claims may be submitted solely by 
qualified consumer protection organizations that—in addition to the conditions applicable to entities 
eligible to launch actions for injunction—meet a set of extra conditions); Nomos (1994:2251) [Protection 
of Consumers, as Applicable, Further to the Following Amendments], EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNESEOS 
TES HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 1994, A:191 (Greece) (conferring standing in art. 10, sec. 
16 to certified consumer protection associations that have at least 500 active members and have been 
registered for at least one year); ZAKON O KOLEKTIVNIH TOŽBAH [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 4 (Slovn.) 
(codifying that standing is conferred on representative non–profit organizations and the attorneygeneral). 
 196. See RZĄDOWY PROJEKT USTAWY O DOCHODZENIU ROSZCZEŃ W POSTĘPOWANIU GRUPOWYM [C. 
CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 4 (Pol.) (confers standing on class members and the regional consumer 
ombudsman); ATT NRU. VI TAL–2012 [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 12 (Malta) (allows both registered 
consumers’ associations and group members to be approved as a group representative); EVA LEIN ET 
AL., STATE OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN THE E.U. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION, JUST/2016/JCOO/FW/CIVI/0099 217 (2017); LAGEN OM 
GRUPPRÄTTEGÅNG (Svensk Författningssamling [SFS] 2002:599) §§ 2–6 (Swed.) (collective 
proceedings may be initiated by group members, civil organizations, and administrative agencies); 
Tommy Pettersson, Stefan Perván Lindeborg, & Malin Persson Giolito, National Report: Sweden, in 
STUDY ON THE CONDITIONS OF CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES IN CASE OF INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION 
RULES 4 (Mats Johnsson ed., 2004); LEI N.º 23/2018, DE 5 DE JUNHO [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 19 (Port.) 
(defines standing widely: citizens, associations, foundations, municipalities, and business associations 
may institute an action); ГРАЖДАНСКИ ПРОЦЕСУАЛЕН КОДЕКС [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 379 (Bulg.) 
(standing is conferred on group members and civil organizations); CIVILINIO PROCESO KODEKSAS [C. 
CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art 3.  (Lith.) (collective action may be launched by a group member, an association, 
or a trade union); Laura Carballo Piñeiro, Consumer Collective Arbitration in Spain. What’s in a Name?, 
in CLASS AND GROUP ACTIONS IN ARBITRATION 88, 91 (Bernard Hanotiau & Eric A. Schwarz eds., 
2016); see generally DISPOSICIONES GENERALES (B.O.E. 2017, 126) (Spain) (Royal Legislative Decree 
consolidating the 1984 Law on Consumer Protection, and other consumer laws, reducing the number of 
these laws from over twenty–five to just a few, such as rules on collective actions; Sections 32 and 33 
of Law 3/1991 of 10 January on Unfair Competition and Section 6 of Law 34/1988 of 11 November on 
Advertising). 
 197. See Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on Common Principles for Injunctive and 
Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights 
Granted Under Union Law, 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60 ¶¶ 4–7. 
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Danish law, the court has the discretion to decide whether the case should be tried 
in the opt–in or the opt–out scheme.  The group representative may be a group 
member, an association, a private institute or other organization, or an 
administrative agency (e.g., the Consumer Ombudsman).198  If the proceedings 
follow the opt–out pattern, however, only an administrative agency may be 
appointed as the group’s representative.  In France, only recognized civil 
associations whose object extends to the protection of the interests at stake may 
institute opt–out proceedings.199 
E.  Party Autonomy and the                                                                   
“Only Benefits” Principle 
The reconciliation of party autonomy and collective litigation produced a 
peculiar asymmetric solution as to group members’ liability for legal costs and res 
judicata effects.  Due to the two–way cost–shifting rule, the prevailing party must 
be compensated for his reasonable legal costs.200  It is evident that in opt–out 
proceedings, group members may not be liable for any legal costs (except the ones 
they caused) and, likewise, the possibility of introducing the American rule in 
respect to collective actions was also generally rejected. It would have been 
inconsistent to do away with an entrenched principle of European civil procedure 
as to collective litigation, while preserving it as to individual actions.  The res 
judicata effects raised a similar dilemma in a few Member States.  It was argued 
that party autonomy is restricted if individual group members could have achieved 
a better result than the one the group representative did (i.e., they could have won 
in a case where the collective action failed or could have obtained a more favorable 
remedy). 
For these situations, European systems invented the “only benefits” principle: 
when collective action is not based on members’ explicit authorization, it may 
produce no detriments, only benefits, for group members.  According to this 
principle, the opt–out rule is reconcilable with the constitutional right to party 
autonomy because it confers only benefits on group members, so their assent may 
be presumed. 
In the case of opt–in systems, party autonomy should raise no major issues in 
this regard, given that group members join the action by means of an explicit 
declaration.  Not surprisingly, in opt–in systems, the final judgment’s res judicata 
effects extend to group members without any limitation.201  Nonetheless, the “only 
benefits” principle emerges as to legal costs, which are normally borne by the group 
representative (group members are usually not liable for them).202  This approach is 
 
 198. See NAGY, supra note 3, at 98. 
 199. See LOI n° 2016–1547 du 18 Novembre 2016 de modernisation de la justice du XXIe siècle [Law 
2016–1547 of November 18, 2016 on the Modernization of 21st Century Justice], J. OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 19, 2016, art. 63 (Fr.). 
 200. See NAGY, supra note 3, at 62. 
 201. See LAGEN OM GRUPPRÄTTEGÅNG § 26 (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2002:599) (Swed.); 
Ryhmäkannelaki [C. civ.] [Civil Code] § 8, 16 (Fin.); ATT Nru. VI tal–2012 [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 
12 (Malta); Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure] § 613, ¶ 1 (Ger.); Giorgio Afferni, 
‘Opt–In’ Class Actions in Italy: Why are they Failing?, 7 J. EUR. TORT L. 82, 88 (2016); Competition 
Act 1998, c. 41 (Eng.); Civilinio Proceso Kodeksas [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 261 & 441 (Lith.). 
 202. See LAGEN OM GRUPPRÄTTEGÅNG §§ 33–36 (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2002:599) 
(Swed.); CIVIC CONSULTING & OXFORD ECON., EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY 
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based on practical considerations rather than on doctrinal issues.  When group 
members expressly join the group, it would be plausible, both doctrinally and 
constitutionally, if they had to run the risks attached to failure.  Nonetheless, as a 
matter of practice, it would be difficult to have them join in matters where the claim 
is small.  The information asymmetry between the members and the group 
representative may warrant that this risk be placed on the latter. 
In opt–out proceedings, the “only benefits” principle, addressing the taboo of 
party autonomy, played a huge role in shaping the legal consequences for group 
members.  All opt–out schemes are based on the principle that group members 
cannot be held liable for the legal costs if the collective action fails.203 
While numerous European opt–out systems simply extend the judgment’s res 
judicata effects to group members who did not opt out,204 a few Member States were 
influenced by the argument that party autonomy is restricted also if individual group 
members could have achieved a better result than the one the group representative 
did.  As it is virtually impossible to assess this on a case–by–case basis, these 
European systems (Hungary, Greece, Portugal, and France) have developed 
innovative schemes to ensure judgments’ res judicata effects without formally 
extending them to group members and made the judgment’s binding nature 
asymmetric. 
In Hungary, it is not obvious if, in opt–out proceedings available in competition 
and consumer protection law, the judgment’s res judicata effects extend to group 
members.  The statutory text does not provide for this specifically.  It deals only 
with the case when the group representative wins and does not address the case of 
plaintiff failure.  More importantly, group members are not parties to the collective 
action, so absent a specific provision, they should not be covered by the res judicata 
effects.  Last but not least, the law provides that the collective action does not affect 
the consumer’s right to pursue his rights individually.205  All these suggest that 
while group members may “use” the judgment if the group representative prevails, 
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REPORT 65 (Senda Kara et al. eds., 2008); ZAKON O KOLEKTIVNIH TOŽBAH [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 
60, 62 (Slovn.); Jorg Sladič, A New Model of Civil Litigation in Slovenia: Is the Slovenian Judiciary 
Prepared for the Challenges Presented by the New Law on Collective Actions?, in TRANSFORMATION 
OF CIVIL JUSTICE: UNITY AND DIVERSITY 213, 215 (Alan Uzelac & Cornelis Hendrik Remco van Rhee 
eds., 2018).  But see CIVIC CONSULTING & OXFORD ECON., supra note 202 (following the “loser pays” 
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chance of a favorable award, he also has to carry the risk of being liable for the expenses the action 
generates); Polgári Perrendtartás [Civil Procedure Code] § 586, 590 (Hung.) (establishing an opt–in 
scheme that carries some “loser pays” risks). 
 203. See Overview of Existing Collective Redress Schemes in E.U. Member States, 
IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011–16, PE464.433, 25 (July 2011), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activi
ties/cont/201107/20110715ATT24242/20110715ATT24242EN.pdf; CIVIC CONSULTING & OXFORD 
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& Karin Linhart, Danish Class Actions—A European Model?, 5 INT’L J. PRIV. L. 229, 238 (2012); see 
generally NAGY, supra note 3, at 101–05. 
 204. See ГРАЖДАНСКИ ПРОЦЕСУАЛЕН КОДЕКС [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 386 (Bulg.); Ley de 
Enjuiciamiento Civil [L.E. civ.] [Civil Code] §§ 13, 15, 221, 519 (Spain); Piñeiro, supra note 196; CIVIC 
CONSULTING & OXFORD ECON., supra note 202; STEFAAN VOET, CLASS ACTION DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BELGIUM 3–4 (2016); Competition Act 1998, ch. 41 (Eng.). 
 205. See 1996. évi LVII. törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról 
(Act LVII of 1996) (Hung.); see also 1997. évi CLV. törvénya fogyasztóvédelemről (Act CLV of 1997 
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they are not necessarily covered by the res judicata effects.  This has not yet been 
tested in judicial practice. 
In Greek consumer collective action, the judgment’s res judicata effects extend 
to all group members (including those who are absent), but only if the consumer 
association is fully or partially successful.  In case the defendant does not comply 
with the judgment voluntarily, a consumer may request the court to issue a payment 
order for him.206 
In Portugal, the popular action follows the opt–out principle207 but shelters 
group members in various ways from the potentially detrimental consequences of 
res judicata.  First, group members may opt out very late, until the end of the 
evidentiary procedure.208  Second, the law erects two exceptions to the principle 
that the final judgment’s res judicata effects extend to all group members who have 
not opted out.  Group members are not covered by the judgment’s res judicata 
effects if the claim was rejected for lack of evidence.  Furthermore, the judge may 
decide to exempt group members from this effect considering the special 
characteristics of the case.209 
Judgments in collective actions have asymmetric res judicata effects under 
French law as well, which has been creative regarding the purview of res judicata 
in opt–out proceedings.  The scheme appears to be a de facto opt–out system, 
although the consumer’s right to opt in is retained and can be exercised after the 
judgment is made.  Accordingly, the judgment’s res judicata effects extend to group 
members on the condition that they accept the award and are compensated.  The 
judgment’s res judicata effects cover only those group members who, after having 
been duly informed, expressly accept the judgment and the compensation.210  
Notwithstanding the conditional nature of the res judicata effects on individual 
group members, the judgment adopted at the end of the group action has a general 
preclusion effect against subsequent group actions initiated in the same case.211 
The German opt–in collective action is worthy of note in this regard, as it 
contains a highly creative solution to the antagonism between party autonomy and 
collective actions.  The regulatory solution is based on an overly extensive notion 
of party autonomy, which prevented the legislature from authorizing the court to 
make a collective money judgment even in cases where a group member consented 
to such.  The doctrinal compromise was that the law empowered the court to make 
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a declaratory judgment establishing that the claim’s or legal relationship’s factual 
and legal pre–conditions exist or do not exist but did not vest it with the power to 
make a money judgment.212  Group members may seek monetary relief on an 
individual basis after the pre–conditions of the defendant’s liability are established.  
The final declaratory judgment is binding on courts in matters between consumers 
who opted in and the defendant, provided these have the same aims and the same 
fact pattern as the collective declaratory judgment.213  With this, German law 
avoided, at least technically, collective awards. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
The European reception of collective actions is probably one of the most 
exciting legal transplantations comparative law has seen, owing to the fact that 
Europe is adopting a legal concept that originates in a fundamentally different legal 
system.  In the end, Europe, in essence, is not transplanting a foreign legal institution 
but, rather, using it as a source of inspiration to create its own version. 
The emerging European collective action model is determined by three 
European peculiarities.  First, European collective actions’ primary function is to 
provide compensation and U.S. law’s notion of privatizing the enforcement of 
public policy is generally rejected.  Second, in Europe, collective litigation raises 
irrational fears: “representation without authorization” is contended to encroach on 
private autonomy; it is claimed that class actions often cannot deliver real 
compensation and cause considerable social damages.  Third, the European legal 
environment raises various regulatory issues that simply do not emerge in the U.S. 
Contrary to the common belief, Europe is not generally following the opt–in 
principle.  From the seventeen Member States which created a special regime for 
collective litigation, the majority (ten Member States) has sanctioned, at least 
partially, an opt–out scheme (four of these leave the choice between the opt–in and 
the opt–out rule to the court).  On the one hand, it may be argued that the opt–out 
rule is generally disapproved, taking into account that representation without 
authorization is not in place in two–thirds of the Member States: twenty–five 
percent of them chose the opt–in system, and in forty percent of them, no collective 
action is available at all (here, traditional joinder of parties and assignments are the 
only means to bring collective claims to court). 
In most European Member States, collective action laws’ purview is limited to 
specific sectors, reflecting the notion that collective litigation should be confined to 
cases where there is a compelling need.  Some Member States have used a step–
by–step approach to extend this mechanism from sector to sector. 
The pre–conditions of collective actions in Europe often go beyond those of 
U.S. class actions.  The collective action is generally required to be expedient or 
superior to individual litigation.  In the same vein, it is often required that the group 
(group members) be definable.  These extra requirements reflect the European fears 
and doubts concerning collective litigation and try to limit it to cases where they are 
apparently more expedient and distribution of the award is feasible. 
In Europe, the heroes of collective actions are non–profit civil organizations.  
Incentive–driven, market–based mechanisms face a general distrust, and for–profit 
 
 212. See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure] § 606, ¶ 1 (Ger.). 
 213. Id. at § 613, ¶ 1. 
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private entities are regarded as being influenced by unacceptable financial 
considerations. 
The endeavor not to impair party autonomy and the ensuing “only benefits” 
principle produced asymmetric solutions in regard to liability for legal costs and res 
judicata effects.  Due to the European two–way cost–shifting rule, the prevailing 
party has to be compensated for his reasonable legal costs.  It is generally accepted 
that group members may not be liable for any legal costs; this risk is run by the 
group representative.  Owing to the “only benefits” principle, in case the collective 
action is not based on the members’ explicit authorization, some European systems 
(Hungary, Greece, Portugal, and France) have developed various solutions to ensure 
the judgment’s res judicata effects without formally extending them to group 
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